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INTRO DUO TI ON. 
(a) Scope & Method: 
The theses of this ~aper are, that if we accept 
Economic Nationalism as a fact, then -
(1) ~lanning and Control by the State of the Footwear 
Msnufactu.ring Industry in New Zealand, during the ~eriod 
1939-191+9, has been in the best interests of the Industry(1) 
and necessary for the welfare of the __ public in New Zealand. 
(2) That such planning and control has been partially 
successful in its purpose. 
Since the application of the rat,ji)g'fllait,,~p kJrinciples 
of the Industrial Bfficiency Act 1936, to the Footwear Manu-
facturing Industry, opinions have differed as to its 
effectiveness as a form of control; but all have agreed that 
an efficient footwear manufacturing industry is conducive to 
the well-being of the co~munity and that 'rationalisation( 2 ), 
is the best method of achieving it. 
In order to provide the institutional background I 
have outlined the history of the growth of the Industry and 
the conditions therein i:'ertaining Qrior to li ceasing., 
(1) See page10 for the definition of the Footwear Manufactur-
ing Industrye Whe1,ever L1sed in the text the term, 'the 
Industry' refers to the Footwear Manufe.cturing Industry~ 
(2) 'Rationalisation' is here used in the special,legal sense 
as has come to be used in N.Z. It means the Bt?lJlication of 
the principles of the Industrial Efficiency Act 1936. 
7. 
Import Control Regulations were enacted on 8th 
December 1938 and gave the Industry com~lete protection from 
importation of footwear and provided sco~e for the im~lement-
ation of the Industrial Efficiency Act through The Industrial 
Licensing (Footwear-Manufacture) Noti.ce 1939. This rational-
isation scheme is outlined briefly and its implications studied. 
The effects of entry and restrictions thereon are 
shown by means of Chamberlinian Analysis (3). This shows the 
need for Price Regulations in order that monopoly influences 
may be reduced once entry is restricted. 
Price Regulations are disgussed and the effects of 
these forms of organisation on the Industry and on the consumer 
are then stated briefly. 
Future trends are also shown. 
In order to avoid overburdening the text lengthy 
explanatory notes are included in the appendix. 
(b) l,_mportance of Studz: 
The importance of this study is two-fold. Firstly, 
the aim of the Industrial Efficiency Act 1936 was to ~remote 
the Economic Welfare of New Zeel~nd(4) by Yarious measures of 
industrial efficiency. The Footwear Manufacturing Industry 
was the first major industry to become licensed under this Act 
--------·----·--------------------
(3) E.H. CHAMBERLIN, "The Theory of Monopolj_stic Competitionn 
Harvard University ~ress. Sixth Edition. 1948, 314.pp. 
(4) From The Preamble to the Industrial Efficiency Act 1936. 
8. 
and the introduction of the footwear ~lan with the setting 
up oi the appropriate industrial committee for the Industry 
thus marked the commencement of a new era in the industrial 
development of the Dominion -- a development along systematic 
organised lines of self government under· the jurisdiction of 
the Bureau of Industry. 
Secondly, medical evidence has emphasised the 
need for correctly fitting and serviceable footwear. There 
is a demand for footwear in every household in the country, 
although such demand varies in intensity. 
To the extent that any enactments purport to 
increase the quality and to promote efficiency io the 
Industry, then welfare of the people must thereby be 
j,ncreased. 
(c) Difficullies of the Stu~y: 
Through lack of data on a regional basis I have 
had to make a more general approach to the subject based on 
published information concerning the industry as a whole. 
Apart from the Official Statistics of Factory 
Production, the only available j_nformation on footwear menu-
fact ur ing con di ti ons is contained in a preliminary report of 
the Committee of Ipguiry appointed in 1929(5) and in the 
(5) Appendices to the Journal 1929 H44A - Footwear Industry 
Pr·eliminary Report (Dealing with the Production of Foot-
wear) of. the Committee of Inguiry. Government Printer 
Wellington, 24.pp. · 
9. 
general statement of the Secretary of the New Zealand Manu-
facturers' Federation made before the New Zealand Tariff' 
Commission, June 1933(6). 
Further information has been gleaned by personal 
interview and I am indebted to units of the Industry and 
officers of the Department of Industries and Commerce for 
their assistance(?). 
A further difficulty has been to confine the limits 
of the field. The actual manufacturing side dominates the 
entire industry and is the side that is productive of the 
guali ty and health maintaining structure of footwear. How-
ever, of necessity, it must overlaJ into the distribution and 
consum~tion spheres as conditions therein are closely 
correlated to the manufacturing side, and to gauge the success 
of any planning and control, recourse must be made to the 
study of 5. ts effects on the consumer .• 
Thus to confine the study to some extent I have 
dealt only with the major controls on the manufacturing side, 
and their effects on the Industry and on the consumer. 
( 6) 
(7) 
.4..:3). MANDER - "New Zealand Industries and the Tariff" 
(H.H. Tombs Ltd., Wellington). 1933• 47•PP• 
In particular I acknowledge ~ermission granted to use 
the following unpublishe·d reports:- (1) The Footwear 
Industrial .Plan Committee's Newsletters to the Industry. 
( 2) W. DENBY, "The 
Footwear Manufecturing Industry". Department of 




The New Zealand Footwear Manufacturing IndustryC 8) 
is deemed to mean that part of the Economic activity which is 
concerned with the manufacture, in New Zealand, of footwear 
for sale. 
Man~facture means and includes: 
(a) Any or all of the processes relating to foot-
wear known as clicking, machining, making, finishing and 
cleaning; and 
(b) Every partial process of the above processes 
as well as any substituted process. 
It does not include the repairing of footwear. 
Footwear includes footwear of whatsoever kind and 
whatsoever materials, but does not include surgical footwear 
or bespoke orders.(9) 
(e) Background to the study: 
P1~ior to the world de_pr-ession in 1930, New 
Zealand was among the best examples of International Econom-
ic Specialisation. Th~ough the export of British 
capital, New Zealand has benefited from the large scale 
industry in the United Kingdom and in return, the United 
( 8) 
( 9) 
It has been stated that an industry cannot be defined. 
But in orfier to study a particular field, some classifi-
cation for the particu1a.1, purpose in view is necessary. 
R. TRIFPIN. nMonopolistic Competition and Gene1"al 
Equilibrium Theo1"y11 • (Harvard University Press) 1941, 
197.p:p. 
This definition has been adapted from the defin1tion con-
tained in The Industry Licensing (Footwear-Manufacture) 
Notice 1939. (Serial No.1939/150) and its amendments. 
:Kingdom had obtained cheaper food from a more highly product-
ive and efficiently managed New Zealand prima~y production. 
However, on such an undifferentiated economy, the 
impact of the depression was disastrous, and a marked acceler-
ation of the trend towards regulation, control and even direct 
exercise of economic functions by the State was noticeable. 
This trend commenced with State co-operation with 
Jrimary producers. (10) Various additions to this machinery 
of control were enacted by the Government as recovery measures 
between 1931 and 1935( 11 )e Enabling legislation to provide 
for the rationalisation of manufactu-Ping industries was 
prepared in 1934 but not proceeded with. 
Prior to 1936, the State had been more concerned 
with policies directed towards primary producing industries. 
A mild measure of 'protection' through Tariff Policy had been 
acknowledged but with New Zealand's Custom Tariff on United 
Kingdom goods especially, among the lowest in the world, it 
could not be said that there was a conscious policy of 
'l)rotecti on' as the United Kingdom was our ma in source of 
importsi 
The serious problem of unemployment however, focused 
attention on the potentialities of the Dominion's secondary 
industries G Here were seen possibilities of absorption of 
( 1 0) 
( 11) 
'The germ of this idea is seen io the ~reamble to the 
Meat Export Control Act 1921-22' - W.B. SUTCH "Recent 
Economic Changes in New Zealand" (Wellington) 1936~p.39. 
For a detailed list of the more important enactments see 
Footnote p.110 - Economic Record (Melbourne). Oct.1939. 
"The State and Industr~r"• B.R. TURNJ.i~R. 
12. 
New Zealand's then 'over-population' (in terms of the absorp-
tive capacity of farming industries)~ 
Simultaneously overseas developments were modifying 
the foundations of the Dominion's economy and from the inter-
national economic specialisation mentioned above New Zealand 
was being forced by Economic necessity towards the policy of 
Economic Nationalism. The imposition of guotas and restrict-
ions on the entry of New Zealand produce into the United 
Kingdom, and the world-wide trend of restrictions on 
International trade did not hold out any possibility of 
exJa nding our market for primarJr J rouuce. 
The fostering of such secondary industries 11 as can 
produce commodities economically for the maintenance and 
improvement of our standard of' living, if imports do not 
expand in proportion to the populatioott( 12) was one of the 
"ten points of l?Olicyttelaborated in the Labour Party manifesto 
issued on 9th December 1935. 
This had its most notable implementation in the 
Industrial Efficiency A~t 1936 which contained measures to 
increase the l_Jressure towards greater efficiency in secondary 
industries in New Zealand. 
The second phase of the State's activity was 
associated with Import Selection and Oo• trol and Price Reg-
ulations, although it can be stated accurately that this 
(12) From J • .,,fl,,. LEE "Socialism in New Zealaodi, (London) 
19 30 I l;-l • 39-4211 
13. 
phase of activity was latent in the l:)arty' s i:>Olicy f'rorn its 
assumption of power in November 1935(13). 
The following guotation by the Honourable Walter 
Nash written in 1936( 14) summarises this trend towards 
Economic Nationalism which forms the background to this 
thesis:-
uTo-day the common convtction in New Zealand and 
in other countries too, is that economic forces cannot be 
allowed to operate without res tI'a i 0- t or regula ti oo. There 
is a determination that such forces must be rationally 
controlled so far as is humsnly possible to control them and 
that the sole aim and object of such control-should be the 
provision of the highest possible standard of living consist-
ent with a country's natural resources and its ability to 
lltilise them effectively." 
However, it mu~t be realised that Economic Nation-
alism is not sn ideal in itself but only the creation of an 
environment in which other ideals can be safely and 
conveniently ~ursued( 15). 
(f) The Derne.nd for Foot~: 
Economics includes the notion of scarcity 8 • d allo-





B.R. TURNER, Op.cit .. p.113. 
From the introduction to "Recent Economic Changes in 
New Zealand." Supra.p.17. 
It will not be desirable in all circumstances. Here, 
however, the existence of such is taken as given. We 
are concerned with planning and control of the Indus-
try within the framework of Im~ort Control. 
For a full definition of Economics and its implications 
see L. ROBBINS 0 An Essay on the Nature and Significance· 
of Economic Science" (London) 1948. 160. pp" 
14. 
oote that economic activity is carried out to allocate these 
means to their best or most efficient uses. 
Thus when discussing the position of the individual 
firm, or the industry, whether they operate under Perfect 
Comt1eti tion, I mi;,er·fec t Comi;i eti ti on or Mooovoly conditions, 
we must take into account that the entrepreneur, when purchas-
ing in~uts for his enterprise, has regard to an assumed demand 
curve f'or his l,)roduct and uses scarce means accordingly. It 
becomes necessary then that we should know the conditions of 
demand for footwear. Even though we may or may not agree 
as to the 'Sovereigni ty of consumer':s behaviour as the 
supreme mover of the economy' we must at least agree to his 
partial influencing of the type of consumers' goods available, 
or alternatively that he is "educatedtt to want what is made 
available to him( 17). This may be achieved through advertis-
ing or be the result of a culture pattern. 
There has been a demand for footwear of some kind 
or other since ancient times and down through the ages 
'rireations' of leather as the basic material, have become 
more and more in demand. 
Very little detailed research has been made on 
this subject"•' but the consensus of oi?inion among manufactuPers 
· as well as distri~utors and retailers of footwear is that 
( 17). 
--··---------
T.B. HOFF llEconomic Calculations in a Socialist Society0 
(London) 1949. eh.III and Appendix B. 
demand is relatively elastic as to income and relatively 
i n e last i c a s to I? r i c e • ( 18 ' 1 9) 
In some instances ~oorer quality goods can be 
classed in the sarne category as inferior goods. <20) Thus 
when in come rises the tendency may well be, to sub sti tu te 
t6wards higher quality f6otwear. 
The Board of Tr~de working party report su~ports 
this view that the demand for Boots and Shoes is income 
elastic, when it states that ft:tll employment creates a 
11 higher and more sustained t?Ublic demand f'or Boots and 
ShoesH( 21 ). Also during the depression it was found that 
the average spending power of the people everywhere fell so 
markedly that lower grades of footwear were sought(22). 
In the decade commencing 1935, there is a notice-
able increase in the per caJita consumption of footwear in 
New Zealand( 23). Qualities, ~erhaps could have deteriorated 
in the period, or the increase in money incomes could have 
been partly inflationary, or both. Furthermore the 1935 
f:i.gures include consumption of, in the main English footwear, 
whereas in 1946 coos urn,Jtion was mainly of loca 1 production, 
and thus not strictly com~arable. 





The concept of ~lasticity of supply and demand is a 
device for measuring the ~ercentage chs • ges io quantity 
su~plied or demanded pursuant to smell percentage 
changes in prices or in money incomes. K.E. BOULDING 
11 Econo_mic Analysis11 (New York) Revised Edition 1948. 
Op.cit. p.128, Et.seq. 
See also J.R. HICKS "Value and Capital0 • Second Edition 
(Oxford) 1948. Ch.2. 
Ibid. J?.28. 
"Boots and Shoesn Working Party Reports. H. M. Stationery 
Office. London 1946. p.31. 
ROY E. CAMERON "The Victoria Boot and Shoe Industry". 
Economic Rec_ord (!J~lbourne) Val.XIII. June 1937. p. 43. 
16 .. 
Such figures then do not give conclusive proof of 
the degree of income elasticity in New Zealand. 
However, more important to our study is the elas-
ticity of demand to price changes. 
conditions is available. 
No study of New Zealand~s 
To some extent, the mode of life in the United 
Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand is similar. Culture 
patterns SlJring from the same common sollrce, influenced of 
course, by climatic and other conditions in tl1eir respective 
countries" With the suitability of styles and t;yl:)es of 
English and Australian footwear for New Zealand conditions 
it is uossible that, generally, the conditions of demand are 
the same in all three countries. In England it has been 
noticed that the market is fai:rly inelastic to price, ( 24) 
while from the conditions described in the Victorian Industry, 
price inelasticity is existent there also. (25 ) 
While we are unable to give any proof of the 
relative inelasticity of demand to price changes, the con-
ditions in the Industry would denote that rmnufacturers are 
faced with less than elastic conditions of demando In other 
words as output increases the additional supply is only 
(23) 
Men's Eoots and Shoes cons Utni.J ti on per 
capita was 1.0 2.0 
Women's Shoes " " " 2.4 2.5 
1935 figures obtained from 'Recent Economic Changes in 
New Zeeland', Op~cit. P.126. 1946 figures obtained from 
the Footwear Industrial Plan Committee's newsletter to 
the Industry - (unpublished). 
(24) 'Boots and Shoes', O~ocit. p.153. 
(25) R.E. CAMERON, 01,)ecit. p.43. 
absorbed at lower prices. This is denoted by the degree 
of advertising found in the Industry, the differentiation 
of products and the other trade practices indulged in to 
fragment the market in favour of their respective products. 
The existence of substitutes also affects the 
position. It has been noted that in ~eriods of low income, 
people substitute to the use of slippers as these are lower 
in price relative to boots and shoes.( 26 ) Couf.lled with 
the possibility of repairing shoes, to increase their life, 
this could have the effect of making_guite substantial 
reductions in price necessary more esf.lecially io depression 
times, in order to increase the sales of footwear. On the 
other hand, they would have the effect of irnf.losing a limit 
on increases in footwear prices. 
No conclusive evidence appears to support the 
retailers' contention of a relatively inelastic demand to 
~rice changes, but the conditions in the Industry would 
denote that there is some degree of price elasticity in the 
demand for footwear. 
There appears to be ample scope for research into 
consumer•s' demand, not only for footwear, but also for other 
basic commodities in New Zealand. 
(26) Ibid. p.43. 
PART TWO 
SURVEY OF THE FIELD 
~RIOR TO LICENSING 
1 a. 
CHAPTER II. 
CONDITIONS IN THE INDUSTRY PRIOR TO 1939( 1) 
(a) Historiioal: 
"Fifty years ago the footwear opera tor was probably 
the worst of an oppressed class of artisans ••.•••• who 
accepted the conditions of the day with a feeling of frustrat-
ion in that he could not turn his hand to anything else to 
make a living. He was obliged to work under appalling 
conditions for low rates of pay and invariably on broken time." 
Such is the opinion of the late Mr. w. Denby, one time 
Technical Adviser to the Footwear Plan Industrial Committee( 2). 
Conditions however, improved in the late ttnineties" with the 
implementation of industrial and social legislation, and the 
growth of the power of Trade Unionism. 
At this time the workman dld the whole of the 
operation in his particular department. For instance, in 
1891 with a total of 47 footwear factories, only motive ~ower 
of 46 H.P .. was used, whereas in 1920, with a greater division 
. 
of labour following on increased mechanisation, motive power 
had increased to 960 H • .2. for 64 establishments. 
(1) Besides from the various references connotated in this 
chapter, I have obtained much information herein quoted 
from personal interviews with the ex Chairman of the 
Footwear Plan Industrial Committee (also Managing Director 
of' one of the largest footwear manufacturing units); 
from Gw ernrnental officers c-oncerned with footwear produc-
tion; and from the major units engaged in footwear manu-
facturing in Christcharch. 
(2) From an anpublished article on the "Footwear Manufacturing 
I ndustry11 • Op. ci t. 
Even so in 1891 it was the most im~ortant of the 
true secondary industries, employing 1,943 ~arsons, whose 
out~ut was valued at £403,756 (£208 ~er head). The average 
size of the manufacturing unit, according to number of 
persons per factory was 41. This co:n;:-iar-es favourably with 
the Victorian Shoe & Boot Industry of the same year.(3) 
industry 
Grad ualI~, the tea rn system developed in this growing 
whereby a stnall team of 4 or 5 combined to 
~reform the o~erations required in this particular department. 
This team system eventually gave way to the chein method 
which we know to-day. Highly Bi:Jecialised machinery was 
developed and the operator became a specialist in a very small 
Ol,)eration ::,f the comf?lex k-'ro,::edure of rnoder•n shoe maldng. (4) 
( 1) Up to 1929. As shown above the average number 
of employees per establishment in 1891 was 41, whereas in 1929 
it haa fallen to 31 persons. In the United States, where the 
boot and shoe industry it ra~uted to bathe most efficient in 
the wo~ld the trend between 1899 and 1919 is guite dift'erent:-
In this i.Jeriod "the incPease in size of plant was so 
l,)rooounced that it resulted io an actual reduction in the 
(3) Victorie~Boot & Shoe Industry in 1891 was:- 92 establish-
ments emJloying 3,787 hends; average numbers per 
establishment 41. Fro~ the New Zeeland Year Book 1892, 
(Wellington). 
(4) See A~pendix A for an outline of the various nepartments 
in shoe making as welJ. as the types of materials etc.used 
and overhead expenses sod calculationso 
number of establishmeotstt(5). 
The following com~aretive figures for the year 1927 
I, 
emphasise# the lack of ~rogress made by the Industry in New 
i 
Zealand;-
TABLE L:_ ( 6) 
Boot & Shoe Statistics - 1927. 
-- -
No. of No. of Persons (a) 
country: establish- Total: Avge .. per Added Value 
ruents: Es tab. : .i?er Head: 
--
New Zealand 81 2,376 29 £251 (b) 
Australia 356 18,783 52 £241 (b) 
Canada 191 15,433 80 £30L~ 
Uni.ted States 1,357 203,110 150 £456 
Notes: (a) Value figures converted to sterling at par 
rates. 
r b \ 
\ ) Added value in these two countries would be 
about the same if -
(-1) an adjustment wss made for values of 
materials used. 
(2) Value per head in N. z. 9robably higher 
because of higher footwear Jrices, thus 
allowance to be made for this factor. 
The inability to compete vl'ith imports, at about the 
same level of tariff protection is also another example of the 
less efficient trend of the industry. Table II shows the 
(5) GvC• BILLING "Size and Efficiency in New Zealand Industry0 • 
The Economic Record (Melbourne). Vol.XIII. June 1937 -p. 60 
(Taken from a guota tion in Black ''.Production Economi.cs" 
p. 580. 
(6) Ibid. 11•61. 
2.1. 
percentage change in exports from the United Kingdom to both 
New Zealand and Australia. 
TABLE II. (a) ( 7) 
Exports from United KinE_;dom in 1,000 Dozen Pall.§, 
Country: Ave.1909-11: Ave.1927-29: Percentage Change: --
New Zealand 73 124 Plus 70 
A_us·tralia 114 53 Minus 53 
(a) Figures ref'er to leather footwea1, only. In 
this period imports into New Zealand from 
Australia declined, largely as a result of 
Imperial ~reference agreements. 
Quantity figures for all footwear made show still 
further the relative inefficiency of the New Zealand factories. 
Coun tr;y:: 1927-28: 1928-29 ( 8) 




It is interesting to note that in the period 1891 
to 1929, of twelve protected industries decreases in size 
occurred in only clothing end boot & shoe factories. 
The above comparisons show that New Zealand Footwear 
Industry was considerably less efficient than in the other 







The Committee of Inguiry re~ort( 9) suµported this 
They suggested an additional tariff of 5% for a period 
of five years in order to create conditions that would allow 
the industry to recover its position. Their investigation 
revealed relative depressed conditions in the industry end 
clear evidence that the local industry was su~Jlying a much 
smaller prOiJ ortion of the tot a 1 trade than pre 1914.-18 -war 
or for that matter in the post war period. From inspection 
of 14 re!?resentati ve accounts 0 only three were retur•ning a 
reasonable rate of profit on capital invested, two were 
providing a moderate but insufficient profit, while nine 
were definitely unsatisfactory .n( 1 O) 
The causes of depression were summarised as follows: 
(a) Unsatisfactory guaotity output of factories as 
related to machinery and facilities. 
(b) Multiplicity of designs of footwear manufac-
tured in indi victual factories and manufacturers' 
present inability to specialise. 
(c) Competition from overseas in footwear which 
could be readily and economically manufactured 
in the Dominion. 
(d) Vagaries in taste and changes of fashion of 
women's footwear. 
( 9) Appendices to the Journal 1929. H44A. Footwear Industry 
Preliminary Report (Dealing with the Production of Foot-
wear) of the Committee of Inquiry. Op.cit. 
(10) Ibid p.3. 
23. 
(e) Apparent lack of cohesiob and initiative 
among manufacturers, and failure to discuss 
frankly and freely their problems and 
di ffic u.l ties. 




( . ) 
'l 
( j) 
High costs of distribution. 
Non-flexibility of labour conditions. 
Unsatisfactory layouts of plant and machinery. 
Lack of sustained na~io• al propaganda to 
assist sales and create goodwill towards local 
industry. 
(k) Lack of satisfactory costing system. 
(1) Inadeguate control of management over factory 
O!:JeratiOOSe ( 11 ) 
(2) During the Depression: Subseguent on the 
imposition of an addi tionsl 5% Tariff on the Im()erial .J:-lref-
ere• ce -rate some of the above summarised causes of de~ressio• 
were temporarily halted or partially eliminated. I • the 
main Jroduction line, boots & shoes~ the local prod~ction rose 
in 1930 to 112,898 dozen pairs while imports of roughly 
comparable ty~es declined to 79,242 dozen pairs. 
The last 'normal' trading yeal'S in the Industry were 
{ 1 ') \ 
1923 and 1924, ,.~; and com~arison with this base period shows 
the growth or the New Zealand Industry since then. 
-------
( 11) I >·1'd · 1n 1.) • t!. -- '-'. 
( .A "') lo<:_ Footwear- Ind us try Preli mi nary Re!:-iort 1929. Op. et t i:-!. 2. 
TABLE III. 
Volume of Boots & Shoes 1923-1938. 
Year: ·------------



















111.i. _L __ ~l+ • ~--
This sustained growth of-local Jroductioo has not 
been achieved ~long any efficient or rational lines. The 
number of estsblishments throughout the early 1920' s vvas 
mai • taine1 at 81 and outJut per head was 644 ~ai~s i • 1920 
falling to 560 fairs (all types) by 1926. It was not till 
1932 that the 1920 out~ut ~er head was exceeded and this 
mainly by the increased ~reduction of sli~~ers. The size 
of the establishments, measured in personnel per factory 
stood at 33 throughout the early 193O's compared with 38 in 
1920 and 41 i • 1891. 
If size is to be one criterion of efficiency then 
little progress hos been ,nade b;:,r tl1e, footwear indLJ.stry. In 
1932 only 6 firtns em~loyed ov~r 100 workers. It is inter-
eating to· note that in 1931, at the Jeak of the de~ressioa 
no firms employed more than 100 wurkers. 
(13) Prior to 1928 the classification of Im~orte~ Boots & 
Shoes, wholly or ~artly of leather, contained some oon-
com~arable lin~s. However, since the • local 
Jroduction and IrnJor'l;s are :nore closely c0rnJarable. 
Any recovery made in the de~ression years was 
partly due to decreased JUrchasing ~ewer of the public 
making for substitution to the lower guality, but hard 
weering shoes that Ne'N Zealand could .,;reduce on a cornf)etit-
ive basis.( 14) This made for increased competition between 
local rnanu:fscturers and combined with smallness of orders 
forced the industry fur~her away from the ideal of 
spec1.alisation. 
It will be n0ted that in depression years factory 
~rices fall faster than retail prices. Because of the 
number of factories OJerating, the m8jority with sur~lus 
caDacity, and for a while SU1.'jjltrn outl?ut, the rnarrn:ili cturers 
were soon at the mercy of retailers. Prices were forced 
down still further by the retailers' desire to sell to the 
corJsi.lmer at i:-lrices to equate the reduced i;iurchasing fiOwer of 
the • .1ublic. Sim1..:il taneously the demand is for a rnore hard 
and long wearing shoe. Manufacturers thus faced with fierce 
competitioo from rival Jroducers, were comJelled to turn out 
bette~-value products, and to sell same, the producers were 
willing to acc·ept prices below the fL1ll cost of 11 roduction. 
In order to stay in business they were willing to sell as 
long as it yielded a surplus above the costs he would incur 
if he did not manufacture at all. 
(14) Prior to Import Control New Zeeland did not manufacture 
to any great degree Meo's and Women's h:i.gh grade shoes 
- See A~~endices to the Journal H44-1940. p.12. 
26. 
As Mr/• Robinson has stated "If an indt1stry is 
depressed the marginal unit of production will probably be 
the output of a more or less typical firm working llnder 
conditions of no exceptional difficulty and its price will 
be equal to the marginal prime cost of a firm working in 
those conditions'' (15). Thus a typical firm would barely 
cover prime cost and an efficient firm will more than do so, 
but may make less than full cost of production. 
~roviding and to the extent firms can borrow(16) 
they will carry on in the hope of eventually covering at 
least marginal prime costs. This will further aggravate 
the position and is likely to flBrsist as long as there is 
surplus capacity in the industry. 
There is the possibility that this comi;.ietitive 
position will not be conducive to efficiency. In depress-
ions the most efficient firm will be producing below full 
capacity and will thus lose economies of scale and costs may 
even increase to such an extent that the once most efficient, 
in a period of" stable output, has a higher cost than the 
small~r firm, in times of fluctuating output. 
On the whole the depression in the Industry was 
(15) E.A.G. ROBINSON "The Structure of Competitive Industry0 
(Cambridge) 1945 - p.90. 
(16) The power to borrow is perhe~s more limited than fully 
realised~ The report of a 'Survey of reports of credit 
difficulties, Department of Commerce, U.S.A, 1945' 
showed that credit difficulties decrease with an 
increase in the size of a firm. JOSEPH STEINDL "Small 
and Big Business (Oxford Monograph Series) 1945, p.5. 
TABL:8; IV. ( 3) 
Cornvarat1ve_T.::ible of Stc1tiDttcs in the Pootwear· Indu.strl· 
Year: I No. of 1€e:c•e:ons j Aye. j Pla;;-t j .Added r:r.otal J 





1~dul t s 
Leather 
Pootwear: 
:31 ii? I} er s ir~ e t( 1 ) I 





notes on Table: 
gst. SmlJloyedls1ze- fer I Value Value 
---+-:-- per~s) _· _ head: head: -+--------1---- -£--+1--, ---------------Nos. Nos. Nos. £ I £ £ 
I I 
J.J PS• J::'I'Sc j}el' 
l1e ad: 
1911 74 2,072 28 N.A. 137 299 720 690 
1920 64 2,447 38 1,602 227 590 6L~ 600 
1924 81 2,473 31 1,583 298 548 625 597 
1926 31 2,5!.+1 31 1,6291 239 L~71 560 537 
192/J 81 2,338 29 1,630 25 8 500 621 561 
1929 75 2,293 31 1,7021 246 l-1-99 598 545 
1930 71 2,307 33 1,882 255 524 700 587 
1931 72 2,364 33 1,841-i 250 Li83 705 571 
1932 69 2,183 32 1,808 238 463 758 575 
1933 70 2,277 33 1,744 235 452 864 634 
193/.i 71 2,429 34 1,713 215 438 939 593 
1935 76 2,541 33 1,5921 213 434 996 609 
~§5~ ;~ §:~g~ ~Z ~:~~g I 16~ ~~~§ ,~:g~~ g~l 
1938 70 3,081 l+4 . 2,065 I 219 450 11,057(4) 538 
1939 69 3,075 45 I 2,115 203 441 J1 ,069 11 557 
19Li-0 71 3, 731 5 3 I 2,328 242 500 1,121 tt . 552 
19Li1 76 4,384 58 I 2,758 254 581 1,181 549 
19h2 76 4,620 68 2,939 289 640 1,359 616 
1943 76 4,513 60 2,990 322 733 1,118 571 
19~)-1- 80 L~,518 57 2,900 337 781 1,1T? 600 
19lG 82 4,569 56 2,907 361 800 11,151 543 
1 §46 90 i+, 660 s2 I 2,929 36s 764 1 , 107 496 



























j ( 1) Net Value per establish-
ment consists of Total 
Value of ~roducts less cost 
N.A. of materials, wages and 
N.A. other exlJenses. (Other 
2,676 ex,)enses do not include 
970 inlerest on capital). 
1 '3-14 .1, 040 (2) TM.s flgure includes 
rubber and canvas footwear 
1 ,417 as well as slippers • 1,482 
1
1,016 (3) Sources are (a) statis-
1,256 ties of Factory Production. 
945 (b) Monthly Abstract of 
852 Statistics. 
827 Both publications of the 
1,232 Census & Statistics Dept. 
j 1,354 '!elli ngton. 
11 ,~;~ (4) The years 1938,39,40 I include large unclassified 1,884 miscellaneous productio. 
1
3,42~7 Money values thereof have 3, 8 been converted to volume of 
1
3,o35 µroduction by dividing such 
3,o39 I mon,~y values b1, the ,)eP ') CJ-::>6 - ... " I~,·'"- 1:1air value of adults shoes z,u39 __ 1 in e»ch year. 2,25!3 
27. 
not conducive to efficiency, 
ea n be gauged from Table IV. 
The position of the Industry 
The output per head tended to rise mainly through 
the increased production of sli~pers. 
output was reached some time in 1932. 
The 1920 volume of 
Both the added value 
and total value ~er head rose for a while but then declined 
to a level below the level of the late 1920's. 
Some recovery was thus made relative to the position 
held in the ea1•ly 1920's. 
Taking size as another measure of efficiency there 
appears to be little growth in this direction. The number 
of persons employed has tended to fall during the depression. 
The subjoined table would denote that this loss of persons 












TABLE Y.:_ ( 1 8 ) 
No. of Firms in each Size Group. 
- Size based oo Employees engaged therein. 
Over 
Under 6 6-1 O: 11-20: 21-50: 51-100 100: 
17 9 1L~ I 
21 8 6 
14 11 16 15 10 5 
36 16 11 8 1 = 
16 12 16 11 8 6 







(18) Compiled from data obtained from The Statistics of 
Factory Production - Government Printer, Wellington. 
28. 
Perhaps also the size of the firms would have 
tended to decrease still further had there been a reduction 
in the short time worked. The incidence of short time was 
far greater in the Industry than in most other industries. 
Short time worked in the IndustryC 19) showed an 
average per year in 1931 of 126 hours ~er male worker and 
98 hours per female worker, while in 1933 the figures were 
85 hours per male and 50 hours per female worker. Comparative 
figures for all industries show that in 1931 the average was 
56 hours per male and 56 hours per female and in 1933, 69 
hours per male and 69 hours per female. 
(3) After the Depression: 
This ~eriod marks the beginning of an upward move-
ment in the cycle of prosperity for the Domioion. By reason 
of increased wage rates, purchasing power ot workers had bee• 
enlarged and "in general, factories in New Zealand," states 
the Annual Reh)ort of the IndL1stries and Commerce Detjartmeot, ( 20) 
1~ave worked at full caJbcity, with substantial increases in 
turnove11 s .• '' 
However, towards the close of the ~eriod uneasiness 
-· 
was prevalent in some manufacturing industries who felt that 
increasi • 8 importations from overseas were adversely affect-
ing their trhde.( 21 ) 
(19) Ibid. 
(20) J1ppendices to the Journals 1937, H44, p.22. 
(21) Ibid p.36, 
29. 
Im~orts of adults leather footwear had been 
iacreasing steadily from the depression low of 31,525 dozen 
pairs in 1-931 to 73,169 dozen fJBirs fop the calendar ;irear of 
1937, a 132 per cent increase, while in the comfJarable fJBriod 
ended 31 st. Ma1·ch 1938 local productjon had shown but a 32'"/o 
increase on the 1931 figures. This is ~artly a reflection 
of the iocome elasticity of demand for footwear in as much 
as when purchasing fJOWer increased consumers tended to sub-
stitute towards the higher grade imported article. Thus the 
increased deman~ was being diverted to importations and the 
local industry tended also to lose some groLrnd it had gained 
during the depression. Output i?airage per employee had 
risen in these six years from 705 to 1,033 though value dropped 
from £483 to £445 l,-)er head,( 22 ) and this while costs and prices 
showed a tendency to rise because of a shorter working week 
and a higher wage structure. 
Towards the close of this period the Industries and 
Commerce Department reptirted that the Footwear Manufacturing 
Industry had expressed a fear that they would be unable to 
compete with imported footwear. (24) This soon became Bl,-)J:)arent 
and although the year had started with big orders being placed 
by retailers, the demand was not sustained. In anticipation 
of rising L_Jrices, the retsilers had acquired stocks of locally 




See Table IV supra. Net value Jer head also showed a 
substantial decline in the period. 
In 1936 a 40-hour working week was introduced, and wage 
rates increased .as well. 
AQpendices to the Journals. 1937• H44. p.36. 
30. 
the year. When these orders arrived stocks were unduly high 
and the New Zealand manufacturers' position became difficultC 25). 
In a survey made before the amendment of the Tariff 
it was found that a cross section of the Industry was making 
little or no profit.( 26 ) Some units were hard pressed by 
business conditions, and were forced into liquidation. 
According to the Statistics, the number of establishments 
dro~ped from 76 in 1935 to 70 in 1938.( 27) 
Short time was still being worked in some footwear 
factories as late as 1937, while overtime in 1938 did not show 
any appreciable lift over previous years. 
and labour costs had risen as well. (28 ) 
Both raw material 
To the extent of 
the market available to the New Zealand producers there tended 
to be internal com~etition mainly by price cutting. In order 
to stay in business some made use of their reserves, and 
ceased to pay dividends, while a number found it necessary, 
for financial reasons, to improve their asset ~ositioo by 
wr·i ting u~ their value through fictitious amounts of 
non-existent goodwill. 
It was with sUch conditions in mind the Industry 
a~plied to the Government for, and was successful in obtaining 





Appe-ndices to the Journals. 1938. H44• f.J• 34. 
In 1939 the net value ver _establishme,12t dropped to the 
very low figure of £521, See Table iV supra. 
The Census and Statistics DeQartment's Annual Report on 
Factory- Production 1936 and 1939. (Government Printer) 
Wellington. -
Ap~endices to the Journals. 1938. p.34. 
31. 
(c) Tariff ~glicy and footwear: 
Up to December 1938 the Industry had always had a 
measure of 'protection' by means of customs tariff. 
By 1929 it had been increased to 25% on United 
Kingdom boots & shoes of leather and had been maintained at 
that level except fol' approximately 3½ years f'ollowing the 
Tariff Commission Report of 1934.(29 ) 
This Tariff Commission was set up pursuant to the 
Ottawa Agreement between Commonwealth countries in 1933. 
Their order of reference was to enquire into the Tariff policy 
of New Zealand and io particular to carry out any adjustments 
necessary to implement clauses 6 and 7 or the above agreement. 
By these clauses the Commonwealth countries Lrndertook that 
~Protection by tariffs shall be afforded against United King-
dom ~roducts only to those industries which are reasonably 
assured of sound o~portunities for success." They also 
undertook 11 whei1e necessary to redLJ.ce protective duti.es as 
speedily as possible to such a level as will place the United 
I<:ingdom f.)roducerin the position of a domestic competitor''(30), 
The Commission's ReJort stated that determination 
of reguirements was clouded by such economic disorders as 
currency instability, abnormal unemployment and guantitetive 






A~Jendices to the Journ~ls. 1935. H28. 
X.B. SUTCH, Op.cit. ~-53 • 
Ai!.pendices to the Journals. 1935. H28. lj.6 
32. 
However, they assQmed that world depression and 
trading conditions were but temporary phenomena and "that 
world economic life and international trade will be restored 
in substantially the same for•rn and governed by substantially 
the same ~rinciples as ~revailed before the deJression."(32 ) 
Also that uBri tish markets for> our ext:,1orts wePe indefinitely 
open at prices satisfactory to us. 11 (33) 
In the 1 ight of these assuml) tion s and following tlrn 
competitive advantage against imJorts that had been Given by 
the rsising of the exchange rnte at the beginning of 1933 to 
25% a~~roximately, the lowering of the British Vreferential 
Tariff rate to 20)b was not unext:-,ected by some rnanufactur•ers 
in the Industry. 
'Ni thin a short time however, the advantages accru-
ing from exchange alteration wsre im~uted into the costs of 
raw materials, and the Inc}LJ.Str;v steadily lost ground to 
im~ortatio • s as Jurchasing Jower recovered after the slump. 
On the 1st March ~933 the tariff was r·estored to 25%• 
~he effectiveness or otherwise of this move is hard 
to tr1sce as bef'ore the ysaP was comJ1eted import selection and 
control were imJlemented. ( 7.4' It was re~orted ~:; that the 
tariff amendment would contribute largely tc the suluti~n of 
the difficulties confronting the Industry but thst the full 
(32) Ibid. p. 6. 
(33) Ibid. ~•7• These aasum~tions did not fit the then trend 
or futur•e tr'enjs of :l.nternt.tiona1 tr-aae, but the,y Peslised 
they had ki s'.lo,"t s•:)fne such assLPnicJtiuns in or•der to 
arrive st A logical conclusion. 
(34) Ai.JJendices to the Journal 1s:38. H4Li-. J:J•3V• 
benefits would not be felt until retail stocks became 
liquidated. O~timism a~peared to be becoming increasingly 
a~parent in the Industry and in certain directions attention 
was being given to·1mr·ds msnuf'acturing lines not l;)reviousJ.y 
undertaken in New Zealand. 
The o~timism, however, did not a~Jear justified in 
the light of ~ast ex~eriences of the effectiveness of tariff 
11 rot ec tion. 
In effect through the im~Josi tion of L1rotective 
tariff the ma~k~t for footweer in New Zealand become 
fragmented -- a section existed for im~orted footwear, mainJ.y 
from the United Kingdom, and a section existed for New Zealand 
~Jroduction. ActualJ.y the seJ.ler in one sector was always 
a Jotential seJ.ler in the other sector~ Thus often one 
sector encroached on the other but in the long ruo imported 
and home 9roduced goods both held a portion of the market. 
Any increase in tariff Jrotectian tended to increase the size 
of the home ~roducers' sector at the expense of the im~orter. 
All sorts of irrational preferences were set ul? in order to 
make the market imperfect both as between im1?0Pted and locally 
produced footwesr, as well as between the various units of 
the local Industry. The above i.-lages give a ml:' le evidence of 
the existence of internal com~etitio• by ~rice cutting, but 




Ilv~ORT sgLECTION AND CONTROL. 
(a) General: 
The Import Control Regulations were gazetted on the 
fifth of December 1938 and came into force the following day.( 1 ) 
By this enactment, importation of all goods into New 
Zealand was ~rohibited unless a license was granted by the 
Minister of Customs or by any licensing officer to whom 
authority had been delegated by the Minister. 
Import Control had been an integral ~art of the 
'insulation' policy of the New Zealand Government and was 
latent in their programme from their election into office in 
1935. ( 2 ) 
The preamble to the regulations includes the notion 
of furthering 'economic and social welfare' and states inter 
alia ttthat the prohibition of the importation of goods herein-
after referred to is necessary in the public interest and to 
the end that the economic and social welfare may be promoted 
and maintained and to enable the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
to fulfil its functions of regulating and controlling the 
transfer of moneys from New zealAnd and the dispossl of moneys 
that are derived from the sale of any New ;iealand 1;Jroducts and 
for the time being are held overseas •...• u(3) 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
-c 3) 
Statutory Regulations Serial No.1938/161. 
For a full descri~tion on this Joint see B.R, 
. Op • c it. p. 11 8. 
Statutory regulations Serial No.1938/161. 
TURNER . 
(b) The effects of Il!l?_ort Control on the Industry: 
Primarily introduced to ration a scarce commodity, 
namely foreign exchange, Import Selection and Control by its 
very nature has a further two-fold function in relation to 
industry~ It ~Jromotes an exi_Jansion of manufacturing indus-
tries by prohibiting im~ortations of similar lines and it 
also enables selection of imports more ~articularly raw 
materials end ca~ital goods -- in order to foster the growth 
of the j_odustries where exi,)ansion is desirable. 
The prohibitions of importations of footwear 
removed some of~imperfections of the total New Zealand foot-
weaP market. By eliminating overseas' competition the scope 
of the local footwear industry was enlarged to embrace the 
complete Nevv Zea land market. The benefits thus granted to 
the Industry were at the expense of the consumer's freedom 
of choice. As the consumer no longer had the choice of 
imported footwear it was imperative that the local industry 
supply the whole gamut that was previously divided by the 
local and imported goods. The application of the Industrial 
Efficiency Act 1936 to the Industry offered scove for 
guare • teeing that the change-over would be made quickly and 
with the minimum of incoove • ience to the consumer. 
The Industry, through competition would in the long 
• ·1 
run achieve some sort of equilibrium, but the wastes of such 
trial and error competition may be detrimental to the general 
welfare of the community. 
36. 
With the knowledge of the total conditions of the 
Industry the ~lanning authority could quickly make available 
to the Industry details of the estimated reguiremeots of th~ 
public and potential out~ut of the Industry. 
To guarantee selection of imports of raw materials 
and cab,)i tal goods an Industries Comrni ttee was consti t11ted to 
examine and make recommendations regarding the applications 
lodged in respect of manufacturing industries in the Dominion 
and to act generally in this regard in an advisory capacity 
to the Customs Department. From its wide knowledge of the 
economic conditions of the Dominion and of the various indus-
tries as well it 1Nas able to see that the reguirements of the 
expanding industriss were met as far as possible. (4) 
Later the Footwear Industrial Plan Committee 
handled all applicstions f'or footwesr machinery. They 
endorsed the ~revious policy, but under this changed system 
they were sble to see that encouragement was given to modern-
ising Jlant. Their decisions when ratified by the Bureau of 
Industry virtually decided whether a• im~ort license would be 
. r r:;) issued or :iot. ,.., 
The footwear Industry exb-ianded under this stimulus. 
In 1939 the size of establishments had increased to an average 
of 45 personnpl per factory rising to 53 by March 1940 and 
output ~er head rose in the same Jeriod from 1069 to 1121. 
---------------------------·-------· 
(4) Appendices to the Journal 1939. H44• p.20. 
(5) Footwear Industrial Plan Committee's newsletter to the 
Industry (unpublished) 1947~ 
37. 
The annual report of the De~artment of Industries 
and Commerce made mention of the expansion of various 
factories but stated that s shortage of labour in some 
instances hampered plans for expansion, but that manufac-
turers were extremely pleased with the future trading 
prospecta.C 6) 
This was really the beginning of licensing to 
restrict entry. By Jrohibiting imJorts, control of entry 
of overseas' firms into the New Zealand market was brought 
about~ 
(6) Ap:,1endices to the Jou.rnal 1939. HL~4• i:-i•37• 
38-
CHAP 'r:I~R IV. 
SP1!;CIAL FE1\TURES OF TH:2 FIJ"~LD f'RIOR TO LICENSING. 
(a) Lack of organisation: 
All industries are organised to some extent. By 
their desire to maximise ~rofits they will seek to so organise 
the use of their resources to achieve this. In general, to 
benefit tlie ccrisumer their acti vl ties should 1:-'roduce reasonable 
( A \ 
guality goods\ ' 1 at reaso• sble Jrices and in quantities to 
meet the existing demand. 
In the above cha~ters we have noted the lack of 
conscious ~lanniog. The output of the Industry, by reason of 
excess • aJacity brouzht ab6ut mainly by internal competition, 
has tended to be ~roduced at higher costs thao would otherwise 
be the er. se. 
A Federation of New Zealand Footwear Manufacturers 
existed with associations io each centre affiliated to this 
cetitr>al organisation. The Industry v1as all:\_O reb)resen ted on 
the New Zealend Manufacturers' Association. Concerted effort 
was made from tiuie to time, usually on rnatten, .:;f Iu1LJ02t 
Tariffs. The i?rotectiori under· tariffs made extens:Luns to 
the mai•ke t avs i 1t,ble to the Ind.us try, but it us Lrn J.ly led to 
small and ~cattered units. 
/ 0 \ 
Dr. SL1tcb r'ei,;orts'-"- 1 tlwt in 193.5 
of j2 8ctual ·factories sm0 veyed;~ 
(1) ~his is take1 to refer to New ZealAnd cunditions. The 
i1sti tutionsl l:HH:kground GDd chu:r.·acter-istics of the bJOi?U-
ls tion would tend to sL1__.,i.Jort tlie cerier-slj_sstion that they 
seek rensonable guali ty goods. Csses do occm~ wher-e the 
vvelf'are of consurneias is best met by low qL1ali ty goods, e. g. 
tTspan's pre-war Asiatic 'rrade. 
(2) 'Recent Economic Changes in J\Tew .Zealand'. Cp.cit • .;i •. 125. 
5 emt,loyed over• 200 Oi:Jera ti ves 
2 lt from 150 to 200 l1 
r: :.; 11 " 50 to 60 " 
8 
,, it 20 to 50 " 
12 
,, under 20 " 
This summary shows that 37½.% em~Jloyed less than 20, ano. 62Jdi 
less than 50 operatives. By 1938 there were only nine firms 
employing over 100 operatives, while the majority, some 57-1/77; 
em~loyed less than 21 operatives and 75-5/7% less than 50 
Ol?er·atives. (3) This movement away from the medium or larger 
scale of operations tended to be ac~om~anied by diseconomies 
and increasing costs and wastage of resources thr-ough excess 
cepacity. 
On the whole this loose knit association of producers 
exercjsed no directive power nor formulated any effective plan 
to promote industrial efficiency. 
The Teriff Commission of 1934 had shown the need for 
the_ Industry to reorganise and to increase its efficiency. The 
· Coalition Government had warned iodustriAlists st lar-ge that, 
'uolese they tackled the question for themselves, voluntarily, 
the Government i:.,f' the day would be obliged to introduce 
com~ulsory measures.,(4) 
This may have led to the :realisation of the need for 
some coosclous plan, that would be legally effective, that was 
a~pareot in some guarters. A section of the New Zealand 
ManufecturePs' Federation desired such e i;;J.an aor.1 the Federation 
- (3) 
(4) 
Figures obtained fpom the Census & Statistics Department, 
Wellington. 
The New Zealand Financial Times, May 1936. p.337. 
40. 
sub~itted to the Government in 1935 e retionsliseticn of 
Industries l1lao. The underlying idea was volunt8ry 
co-ordination of all factories in the same class of produc-
tion. Two-thirds majority vote of output was necessary 
for the 'schemes' to be binding on the Industry, and once 
approved by the Industry and by the Government they sought 
legal enfor•cement thereof. (5) However, although the Govern-
men t had drafted empowering legisle t Llre the scheme was not 
1;1roceeded with. 
(b) Competition$ 
This lack of conscious ~lanning in the Industry u~ 
to the time of licensing led to trade rivalry and com~etition. 
Tariff ~rotection aod later Iw~ort Control, while enlarging 
the limited market did not lesd to the elimination of ineffic-
ient workers, methods, firms or ty~es of ~roductioo. So long 
as there was excess capacity in the Industry sod a tendency 
for surj?lus supply oTrer dernaod there wss inter•nal competition 
for the limited market. 
In one sense of the word, competition ea • be defined 
as the ability of a superior process or product to displace an 
inferior one. (6 ) 
This is but a description of the whole cosmos of 
society and ie one of the principal factors affecting the rate 
of economic ~regress • 
(5) See The New Zeeland Finsocial Times May 1936,. p.337 for a 
detailed description of the [...,lati. Io the lilain it followed 
the provisions of the later Industrial Efficiency Act 1936. 
(6) K.E. BOI~DING - Op.cit. p.452. 
From this definition, broad as it is, a subdivision 
into two ~arts is useful. 
(1) Perfect Cornpfilition: 
Meade(?) states that for competition to be Perfect 
no ·single buyer or seller must be able to exercise any apprec-
iable control over any price. 
For this to be so the following conditions are 
necessary:-
(a) There must be a large number of independent 
buyers and sellers. 
(b) The ;asrket for the cornumdi ty must be perfect 
in the sense that every buyer must buy from the seller who is 
offering the lowest price and every seller must sell to the 
buyer who is offering the highest price. This of course also 
implies complete mobility of factors and also that there is 
perfect knowledge of the future.(B) 
( ')) ,:_ I Im.12,£rfect Competition: 
By definition, if the above criteria are not co-
existent the • the forces of competition in that field must be 
itilperfect. For our prese • t analysis it is sufficient to 
classify com~etition in these two forms. Professor Chamber-




J.E. MEADE "An introduction to Economic Analysis and 
Policy11 - Second Edition (Oxford) 1946. (-'• 126. 
F.H. KNIGHT "Risk Uncertainty & .t'rofit" ~ Ret?rint (London) 
191-1-6. Professor Knight lays i;iarticL1lar stress on 
Uncertainty ea using Imb)erfect ions of .;;.-1arke tg. 
"The Theory of Mooo~olistic Com~etitioo''· o~.cit. 
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perfect competition, through to Monopoly, with intervening 
mixtures of both shading into each other. We find Uf!OD 
examining the field of footweer production in New Zealand 
that there exist many imperfections of the Market and of 
competition. 
(a) The first condition above can be examined in 
the relations of ma • ufacturers in their ca~acity as sellers, 
and retailers (including distributors) as both buyers and 
sellers; and consumers as buyers. 
Firstl~~: In his r•elst.ions to the retailers, who 
are the buyers 6r his ~roducts, the manufacturer had to contend 
with comLJeti tion f1'om locally produced as well ·as imported 
footwear. He tended to brand or differentiate his products 
and offer other services in order to fragment the market in 
his favour. This made the New Zealand market a series of 
small markets not differe • tiated entirely by distance and 
transport costs but by the attachment of buyers through 
differentiating the ~roduct. 
Before the Second World War, further imperfections 
of the market are seen in the attachment of the big manufac-
turi_ng firms to certain selected clients j_n the main centres 
(known as the 'cream of the trade') by selling their ~roducts 
to them at s~ecial rates. This gave the large firms a certain 
continuity of orders. hlarshall( 10) thought that the demand 
curve for such a Jroducer's s~ecial market would be very 
(10) .t'rinciples, 8th J:dition, LJ.458. 
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steep. There is no doubt it would be less elastic for at 
least a short period, but with the differentiation of vroduct 
remaining it would never become exactly horizontal as it 
would be under ~erfect com~etition. There would Always be 
some con1ection with substitutes but nevertheless this 
~rectice tends to fragment the market and make for a distinct, 
though not absolutely inde~endent market for the manufacturer 
ss a seller, 
Retailers tended to order New Zealand 
made footwear in small guantitie.s nt relatively shoPt intervals 
as Pegui:eed. These seemed to be sui;;plernentary to the main 
orders Jlaced overseas about once every six months when a 
whole season's su~ply would be ordered. As would be expected, 
the retailers tended to 1'push11 these lines, and to L1Se the 
1nore re&5.il,y avgi}able New Zealand su.~Jly as a standby. ( 11 ) 
This tended to become a standardised Jrocedure over time, and 
although g ua li ties may have become eg 1m 1 in s irnils r imi:-'ort ed 
and locally produced footwear there ai:-1Je8red to be no atternLJt, 
in some guarters, to '~ush' New z,~aland made :footwear. ( 12 ) 
This may have been caL;.sed by the at:-iathy of New ZealAnd manu-
factur3rs, but more likely was caused by financial commitments 
Or business interests between the New Zealand imt-1orting 
ihter>ests and over-seas' i?roducers. 
( 11) 
( 12) 
'The Footwear' Manu.facturing Industry' ( 1.1.rJl,)Ublished) 
01,J• ci t. See also P. • E. LlAlIDSR 11New Zealand Industries 
and the Tariff11 , o~. c it. l.1. 36. This is a wore general 
statement on this phenomenon. 
Bee Clause (C) of the Conclusions - Appendices to the 
Journal H44A - 1929, ~.10. 
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!,_hirdly: Because of the com~lexity of manufacture 
very few consumers have com{;Jlete knowledge of the guality of 
footwear offered him. Both diffel'e ntia t ion of footwear and 
advertising of both manu.facturers and retr.iilers tend to furthe1' 
aggravate the difficulties of his making a rational choice. 
Lacking perfect knowledge of the market he cannot buy from 
the seller offering at the lowest ~rice. t<'urth ermora he is 
likely, in some cases to become attached, from habit or other 
reasons, to certain retailers and is not likely to change his 
souree of SLl[;Jply following a slight reduction in price 
elsewhere. 
(b) We have Sl:JOken of the consumer-'s inability to 
-always buy from the seller offering his goods at lowest price. 
This is but one irni;,erfection of the second reguirernent of a 
perfect market. 
When the large firms attach themselves to selected 
clients as noted above,( 13) (14) they tended to sell any 
survlus production they had at a discount to wholesalers. They 
in tur • i combed the smaller towns for business or filled urgeat 
orders ex store, selling often at higher :?rices than were 
obtained by the factories selling direct. This also gave a 
big market to the smaller and often the lesser efficient firms. 
These amalle~ firms were also a vital source of su~ply to 
( 1 3) S up ra p • 37. 
(14) This attachment has been noted also as between imports 
and the main cities. W,B, SUTCH. Op.cit. p.125. 
retailers not co the direct sales list of the more economic 
firms. They could usually sell at prices between the direct 
factory ~rices and the wholesale prices of footw~sr made by 
the larger firms. By these imperfections of the market 
Mechanism there existed an hierarchy of prices for identically 
made shoes as well as for close substitutee. 
(c) Further Im0erfections of Comvetition: 
Besides the methods of distribution noted above 
there was the multi~le unit that manufactured, wholesaled, and 
retailed boots and shoes through their own shops. 
ensctred a given-output to the manufacturing unit. 
This 
However, 
in so far as they sold to other retailers, price variations 
would exist for identical footwear. Likewise as they retailed 
other makes in their retail stores as well as their own manu-
fecturers they w6uld tend to 1 L)UBh' their own lines and exert 
influence on the market JP • cesses. 
Advertising by both manufacturers and retailers was 
indulged in to quite an extent and 'services' were offered to 
attract-prospective buy~rs.( 15) These ali tend to make 
competition imperfect. 
Many other imperfections of competition exist but 
the above are the more noticeable ones. While this type of 
competition dld exist it was not free to reach its own intensity. 
(15) In multiJle retail stores these 'services', (tea rooms, 
luggage devots, mailing f'."lcilities, etc.) exist for the 
benefit of customers in all departments. However, in 
footwear deJartments and in footwear stores such devices 
as X-Ray shoe fitting machines are s~ecific 'services' 
to attract buyers. 
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Legal restraints, exogen%us to such forces set limits above 
or below which it was not free to go. 
The msin onee were:-
( 1) L~bour regulations setting out hours of work, 
mi n imu.m rate~\ of pay and tyi? e of workman to be em!? loyed. 
(2) ;[.§_£to1'y regulations denoting minimu.m standards 
of working conditions for health and safety reasons. 
( 3) Standards of ,:;;;,uali t_l: These were set out 
. ( 1 6) 
under the Footwear Regulations Act 1913• This did not 
cover complete quality standards but refer to the need for 
footwear to have soles of leather. If this was not so, then 
the footwear must be stamped to show what the substituted 
com~one• ts consisted of. Sxem~tions were made to cover the 
ordinary filling spaces, shanks, rubber outsoles or in the 
case of ladies' fancy footwear-, the fillings used in heels of 
wood or celluloid. 
It was an offence to sell any footwear that did not 
com~ly with these requirements. 
Through regulation of 
profits, business activity and promotion, checks are made on 
the degree of competition available. 
The chief among various enactments are:-
(a) Co~mercial Trusts Act 1910. This was designed 
to Jrevent concessions etc. in consideration of exclusive deal-
1.ng and also to [..)reve• t sales at uoreaso • Ably high Jrices 
(16) N.z. Statutes 1?13. No.43 - 11th December 1913. 
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which have been fixed or influenced in aoy way by a commer-
cial trust. Provision was also made to deal with monoJolies 
which are of such a nature as to be contrary to ~ublic interest. 
Its benefit lay niore as a j\;terrent r•ather than an 
enforceable law by Court action. 
(b) The I'revention of Profi te_eri,Q£: Ac!_ 19j.§. Its 
main purpose was to give ~rotection to consumers and ~urchasers 
of goods generally, from any form of ex~loitatian in the matter 
of LrnjustLfiable increases in )rices. This was enacted to 
help ensur0 thet the recent wage increases would bsnefit the 
r Pc1·,,~,~t1-t.·-· (17) 1\s the )e.::iod w,:1s still one of excess su,)nl-.v_. - l: J..·..,;. vO B , n .. i:'t-" 
sod lagging demand t~ere was no marked wish to increase ~rices 
disproportionately. 
iog influence. 
Agsin its effect was more as a restrain-
1939.(iS) 
(c) ~oerd of Trsde (Vrice Investigation) Regulations 
Under these regulati0as it was en offence to 
increase ie:rices o:' f,.,Jecifi ed goods ( i nclul"'.:ing foutwear) after 
this d a t.e unless the Price Investigation Tribao sl was notified 
of such increase, end r~asons therefor biveo. 
Labour 2-lJCJ fF,cto:c~" regulsti~-ns as Nell as r'"J',J.al:Lty-
restrictions on use of fectors while the others r,2strict the 
amount of ~rofit thAt ea• be exacted from the use of these 
fa c tor s in t he co mi! "3 t i t iv e rn1:1 ,:, k et • 
(17 Appendices to the Journals. H44 - 1936. J.26. 
(18 Come intc force un 2nd JLwe 1939 •. :';mendtne11tr, E,nd nclc1it-
ions we1·e,, f'r-om time to time mode, i::ulmineting in the 
Control 0f 1rices Act 1947. This was the beginning of 
µrice regulating in the Footwear Industry. See Part III. 
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(d) :i:ffects uf' Cornl2.,£t i ti en: --
Within these legal and social limits comLJeti tion 
was free to find its own intensity. At times it was very 
acute, and led to haphazard conditions in the industry.( 19) 
However, we c~rn summarise the effects of competition, 










( 1 ) 
This 
(1) Instability of the Industry. 
(2) ~astage of resources. 
(3) Low Quality Footwear. 
Instability of the Industry: 
is evidenced by the subjoined tables. 
N.Z. Footwear Llanufacturiog Industry. 
Establishments in Size Groups - AccordinE 
to Workers Em1.)l.QXed. 
Percentage of Total in each cate..&..Q;C_;Y. 
NoQ of Under UodeP Under· Ovep 
e stab. 6 20 50 50 
·-I-• 
75 22. 6 53.3 81. 3 18. 7 
71 19.7 57.7 78.9 21.1 
72 50.0 87,5 98.6 1.4 
69 23.2 63.8 79.7 20 .. 3 
70 1'T4'A. 57 .1 75.7 2l+.J 
N.11. denotes ,information not available. 









(20) 1938 figures obtained from Census & Statistics De~art-
ment. Other figures compiled from the Factory 











TABLE VII. (21 ) 
N.Z. Footwear Manufacturing Industr~. 
Overtime and Short Time Worked. 
Showing Total Hours Worked for year 
.§S an Average of all Workers em.l:c!l.QlQd in the 
Ind us try. 





Footwear 'All Industries Footwear- All I ndu.str:ies 
Male Female !YI. F. M, F, M. F. 
1 • 0 1 • 0 34.0 15.0 68.0 50.0 18. 0 11.0 
2 .. 0 100 25.0 9.0 126.0 98,0 56.0 56.0 
4.0 14j>o 24.0 24.0 85.0 50.0 69.0 . 69.0 
12 .. 0 1-7,. 0 31. O 26.0 63.0 33.0 32. Cl 24. O 
13.0 17. 0 35.0 34.0 38.0 22.0 26. 0 22.0 
8.0 13 .. 0 36.0 30.0 1 o. 0 4.0 15.0 4.0 
4.0 s.o 41.0 27. 0 62. 0 39.0 15.0 9.0 
11. 0 14.0 45 .o 123.0 10.0 5.0 1 o. 0 11.0 
I 
Short time is defined as lost time through machine 
toels etf• be:i.ng out of order, lack of' materials, adverse 
marketing conditions, cessation of work due to weather condit= 
r22'i ions and other c.;ognate causes.' ' In the maio short time in 
the footwear industry has been the result of adverse market 
conditions. This is evidenced in the 1938 figures which show 
the footwear industry to have a short time tn•oblem 400% greateP 
than in the average of other industries. While in the average 
for all indu~tries there seems to be very little difference 
(21) Source!- Factory ~roductio~ Statistics for the variou~ 
YeBJ'S indicated. 
(22) From the definition thereof in 11 The Factory Productio~,; 
Statistics" - Government ~Jrinter•, Wellington. Cc 
50. 
between n181e 30c1 fer:iale 'short time' figures, in the footwea1~ 
lost to male workers. They man cost of the key machines or 
departments snd with adverse conditions there would not be 
enough orders to kee~ them occu~ied Rt full ca~acity. On 
the other hB • d their out~ut 0er head being greater, when orders 
come ~o hand at irregulsi intervnls there would tend to be a 
bottleneck io :3ome r'lei:>artments 011d thus the f'ernale woPkers 
would have to work overtime to turn out the orders at short 
notice. 
'Yhen short time statistics are couµled with over•time 
statistics the resultant table shows the instability of t~e 
inr':ustr~' frc::i[;J lock of OPdei-s, as well as il'regularity of and 
unec6nomic size of orders. Io the main, irregularity of 
/-, 
orders would cause the need of o7ertimm to be worked in the 
Footwesio Industry when economic :;onditj_ons are such that such 
a large sr·rnr of v:ol'l=er,s is :naintsined on aho1·t thoe Jay. 
PPoductive cai.Jacj_ty goes to waste, y-ct com.,etition dernsnrJ.s 
that orders, at times,be executed with alacrity a •d coats of 
output are increased by the ~enal rates of wage JDyments. 
This would not denote efficiency a • d is so adverse effect of 
(c) I .. egtslst:ton 
. (2--Z' 
DS noted above_~; sets down mioimum 
requirements A~ to working conditions, sod yuality of output. 
However, by reason of the larger • umbers employed, the larger 
(23) Sui;,r-a kJ• 46. 
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factories tend to feel the full weight of these regulations. 
smaller factories, the small, family tyl;-le of concern tend to 
escat;1e the full weisht of '~oli.clng' of these l'egLJ.latiuos Bnd 
8 lso ·where they e111; _ , loy onl;:,r one or two o~era ti ves the regul-
ations are quite often overlooked and the eml:iloyer, etnt)loyee 
relationshiD is not so marked. 
Thus the larger firms were at a disadvantage sod 
sought measures to effect some restrictioo on entry, or 
8 llevia ti or. of the "non-fl(:3Xib ili ty of preseo t labour 
condltions. ll( 24) 
(2) Wast8ge of :':lesources:-
(a) Small Orders. It has been noted that orders 
were placed in small numbers at infrequent intervBls and in 
various sizes, and ranges, by retailers. .Alt l1ou.gh if the 
sizes were com~leme• tary some economies of material cutting 
would be achieved, this would be offset by the dis~ro~ortionate 
costs of setting up and adjusting the various rnachjnes for the 
varying sizes,styles and Jrocesses. 
(b) .c)urchasing of l,!aterials: Fancy leathers, for 
Ui:1l;:lers, are the main raw meterial, su.bject to sudden fluctuat-
ioos in fsshion desiG • s. Once the manufacturer has cut these 
leather's in ao~·iciLJBtion of v0rious fashion demands the risk 
of loss is appreciable. Furthermore as these are im~orted 
and the lag io receipt of materials is fairly great, he is 
forced to carr~- larger· stocks than he wou1d. j f the goods were ---______________ __._ _________________ _ 
{24) A~peodices to the Journal H44A - 1929. p.10. 
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8 vaileble locally. If the demand chooges the • he is left 
with various colours and styles of leather that have little 
market value.( 25 ) 
(c) Bankru~tcies: The incidence of bankruptcies 
ebd ~rivate assignments was greater in the Footwear Manufac-
. . (26) turing Industry tha • in other secondary 1ndustr1es, In 
tl1e p eri ,:-id 1929 to 1 93"3 -- some 39 boot and shoe manufactu1·ers 
r07\ ceased business.\~ 1 While eguipment in the nature of plant 
wol:tld tend. to be leased aga:i.n and thus • ot lost to the 
industry, ~astage, through comp~titive forces, exists in as 
much as the organisation of the firm vaaishes. 
(d) Excess Capacitz: Any t;>ersoo w i ti1 relatively 
little ca~ital cao commence the business of footwear rnaoufac-
turing as the greater part of the machihery used is leased 
from a shoe machinery firm.( 28 ) Entry being easy many oew 
entrants commenced business aod the ultimate result was an 
increase in competition for the limited market that existed 
prior to licensing. The entrepreneur finds that it pays to 
sell ti s m1J.ch as he can at the current market f)rices. B lJ.t if 
all 0roducers do this, ~rices may fall below costs and over-
production of footwear in relation to demand for them at 
(25) 
(26) 
Unde~ the stimulus of expansion in the footweer industry 
during the 1940's increased calf aod sheep skin leather 
production has been undertaken by the Tanneries. Kid & 
Suede Kid goat have stiJ.l to be imported as the skins are 
not av~dlable in N. z. Also N. z. is climatically unsuited 
to msnufacture of patent le13ther>s -- i\Qpeodices to the 
Jour•nal HLr4 - 1945. p. 2, 
Some food processing industries show a higher> mortality 
rate, but these are more in the nature of semi-primary 
i nd us tries. 
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economic prices, ensues, followed by losses, unem~loyment 
and short time work. Firms will thus be forced to reduce 
output and operate at less than full CBJacity. Resources 
are thus wasted and the lack of a bold plan in the interests 
of the Industry results in economic loss to the industry. 
(3) Low Quality Footwear: 
When prices fall throL1gh c:imi.Jeti tion entrepreneurs 
will reduce costs as much as ~ossible to maintain a profit 
over and above costs. In as much as guality tends to be 
greater the hicher the price of the raw material 1 the manu-
~acturer will substitute to ches~er and in the main inferior 
quality materials. Furthermore minimum statutory requirements 
as ta quality of footwear become maximum standards. 
(e) Reasons for the IndustrL11.cen~ing (Footwear Manufact11re) 
Notice 1932_. 
(1) ':"ho effects of' cc:.1"'etitiun showed the rnsnuf'sc-
turers thAt planning was the only snswer to these ha~hazard 
conditions. In the rationalisation ~rinciJles of the 
Industrial ~fficiency Act 1936 could be seen the J • ssibility 
of obtai• ing security by ~roductive and narketi •g efficiency 
method of sct4vity. This Act gave Jromise of consolidation 
---
(27) From ''Hisce1laneous Gt:::1tir0 ties Re,,Jort'' - Government 
Prlnter, Wellington, c;:;ml;iJ.,:;r1 fr-otn ,fota fop the varicus 
year,:;. J\()proximately 50% of these firms employ·ed 
lab o uJ.• ~ 
(28) For detBils of the system of machin0 leases see Appendix 
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that hed not been achiev~d under Tsriff ~rotection; elimio-
ation of excess capscity by restrictions oo entry and 
retion0lisation thus assuring a market for reasonable guolity 
t->roducts. 
had 
Further fo1.· S)tfle time the better clsss manufacturers 
( '.)OJ striven to 0vercome th~ adversity to New Zeeland footwear•- 7 ~ 
By licensing of ~recesses and types they saw an augumentatioa 
to their endeavours for the necessary skills for particular 
types and Jrocessea would be a Jrereguisite of authority to 
Prioi• to the 0,nir· the Ind,1.stry had been subjected to 
strong competition .fron; ovsrsea;::,. It hes been ststed that with 
only a portion of New Zealand's regL1iraernents being mamlfE1Ct'Jred 
locally, the :r>esult was that em.-,loyment Yrns bej_n 6 given to 
overseas' workers, over&ess' raw materials w~re bei • g used, 
and our oversees' funds deJleted by ~urchases uf footwesr that, 
it was -~ontended, could bE, rnaouf::,ctur•ed in New Ze8lnnd. 1'The 
footwear industry was licensed with the object of remedying 
this unsatisfactory situation and to drovide constant and 
usefuJ emf}loyrnent for the lar·ge 1umbers of i!eo1,-,le deJendent 
· on it f'or their· livelihoodt,(30). 
It ~ould, however, a~Je&r that oversees' com0etition 
had been eliminated directly bi the ~rohibition or im~orts, 
In so fm~ as 1iceusi • g achieved efficiency within the Industry 
aad a cove:f•sge of ecnsumeps' l'eguirernents then it wo1.1ld be 
(29) 'Footwear Manufacturing Industry'. O~.cit. 
(30) The 1-lan Comuii ttee's Newslette:>.' to the Inc1ustr~r, Ol!• ci t. 
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jJ;tv:ing useful et111:iloyment tc, 1::, large bcdy of workers. Bllt 
?t did not directJ.y el:i.minate overseas' cornl)et:Ltioo. Furthe1•-
more, it was not tiJ.1 some nine months after Import Contr·ol 
had been enacted that the Industry was licensed. (31) 
(2) :t;mb)loyees i11 8 • industr•y to be licensed also 
'have a sa;y as to whether the ind.nstr-;y should be licensed. 
,: _- . 
The Act provides that a majority of units, persons em~loyed 
iod office staff shall be necessary before aa a~Qlicstion, for 
the industry to be licensed, is considered. Through licensing 
the workers would tend to achieve better working conditions 
and security of' e;;Jl}loywent. 
The onus, however, once lice • sing is obtained, is 
o.n the workers to see thcJt sL1ch ber.ef'i ts are not obtained. at 
the expense of other groups of' the community. In other words 
they should ensure, as far as possible, that these increased 
benef'its to them are coupled with an ultimate rise in the 
productivity of their labour. 
r3\ 
\ I Ultimately the question as to whether the 
Industry was brought within the licensing provisions of the 
Act was entirely at the discretion of the Honourable the 
Minister- of Industries and Commerce. It thus became a 
matter of Government tolicy. The general ~ur0ose of the Act 
was "to pPomote the economic welfare of' New Zealand by 
so regu1 atiog the ger::e1~s l orga oh;ati on, develorrneo t and 
(31) The advantages and disadvantages of Im~ort Control and 
interoational trade do not enter into the sco~e of this 
thesis, 
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operation of industries that a greater measure of industrial 
efficiency will be secured. 11 ( 32 ) 
The footwear manufacturing industry ~rovided scope 
for these ideas ~ad by absorbing increased workers in the 
Industry it was able to give effect to the Government's policy 
of Full Em~loyment, 
- (32) Fl'om the preamble to the IndLlst1·ial Efficiency J\ct 1936. 
CHAPTER V. 
THEORETICAL POSITION_QE,_THLl,W)USTRY 
PRIOR TO LICENSING AND A STUDY OF' THE 
PROBLEMS OF ENTRY AND PRICE CUTTING. 
57. 
( a) General: 
Up to the advent of licensing the industry was 
faced with all the aspects of imperfect competition. It 
arises according to Oharnberlin( 1 ) from what he calls the 
differentiatio1i of the product -- '1a general class of product 
is differentiated if any significant basis exists for 
. distinguishing the goods (or services) of one seller from 
those of another0 ( 2 ). The various imperfections noted in 
the previous chapters are sufficie • t to JUt the products of 
the Footwear Manufacturing Industry( 3) within ihe class of 
differentiated goods. 
Throughout this chapter it is assumed that the 
producer seeks to maximise his immediate profits. He will 
thus maximise his profits in the long run also and it will 
thus become his preferred or equilibrium position. The 
Industry will be in egui libri um if II too re is no tendency for 
it to expand or contract«C4). 
be normally profitable. 





••The Theory of Monopolistic ComJeti tion" - Op, ci t. 
Ibid. p.56. Full details of the various aspects and 
forms of product differentiation are contained in Oh.IV 
thereof. pp56-70. · 
Throughout this chapter I have used the word 'producer' 
as synonymous with the Footwea~ Manufacturing Industry. 
K.E. BOULDING - Op. oit. t-i-479• -
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(~) Equilibrium under ~erfect Oomµetition: 
Under Perfect com~etition the ~rice of the ~roduct 
will equal its marginal cost. Since the firm can sell as much 
aB it likes at the given price its average revenue curve is of 
infinite elasticity. Marginal ~evenue is the addition to 
total revenue of selling one more unit and in Perfect Compet-
ition it will be constant. ~rice will thus egual both average 
revenue and marginal revenue.(5) But as factors are free to 
move from one occupation to another each commodity will tend 
to be supplied in such amounts that its price will also e~ual 
its average cost of production. Each factor will thus be 
paid the value of its marginal product. 
If it were above this average cost (which includes 
normal profits)(~ new firms would enter. The total output 
would increase and the price off'ered by the consumers would 
fall (i.e., the price to the Industry). 
Alternatively costs will rise as new units enter the 
Industry. This is because the demand for factors increases. 
If the first producer stayed at his former position he would 
get an unearned increment so he writes this into his costs by 
goodwill (i.e., he imputes his costs by taking into account 
replacement costs). This makes the average cost the same for 
all units in the Industry. 
(5) See J.E. MEADE 11An Introduction to Economic 1\nalysis and 
Policy" - Op.cit. PP.95-118. 
(6) Normai Profits is the minimum prof'it necessary to secure 
the entrepreneurs services. E.H. CHAMBERLIN - Op.cit. 




£nTRY or n£w r1Rm5 UnDER PERFECT comPETITIOn 
Ler 
00 be averar,. cost curve pnor fo enf,.'f of new un,ts (,ncl off prolit~ 
me be, ~ rnar1'nal cost curve. · 
QQ' be ,he, neN averar ca,t curv~ clre,,. enlry ( incl. normal proht,.J 
PP' be the averll<f revenue,. curve. 
-lhin £' 15 the ~r;libnurn po:;it,bn when maximum prol,t:; are 




However, the tendency could well be for both to 
react together. 
GraQhically the egailibrium can be shown as in 
Figl.lre 1. The tangency point E1 is at minimum average cost 
and all are making but normal profits. If profit falls below 
normal, average cost lies above the average revenue curve (pp1) 
and then producers and factors of production will tend to move 
- elsewhere. Then prices will rise as supply from the whole 
Industry to the consumer falls and/or costs will fall until 
normal profits ~re again made. 
Here we see the producer can sell as much as he 
ple~ses at the going price as he is completely merged in the 
general market.(7) 
(c) Im~rfect Comµetition Equilibrium: 
It is a condition of Imperfect Competition that the 
divergence of the Demand curve from the horizontal of figure 
one imposes upon the seller a Jrice problem absent from per-
feet competition. Thus as he sells more,price will tend to 
fall and as he restricts output,price will tend to rise. 
In order to maximise his profits he will produce and 
sell more "so long as what he adds to his costs by producing 
ab extra unit •••• .., is less than what he adds to his receipts 
by selling an extra unit". (S) 
Under Perfect Competition he produces so long as 
marginal cost is less than price, ioe., until it eguals price. 
( 7) Ibid. ~• 70. 
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This will be also where Marginal Revenue equals Marginal cost. 
In Imperfect competition he will also produce up to where 
Marginal Revenue equals Marginal cost but as Marginal Revenue 
is always less than price he will stop producing at some point 
before the price of his product has fallen to the level of 
Marginal cost. 
level. 
Here he will be working at a most profitable 
In figure two this position is shown. It includes 
all attainable profits, but if factors of production in equally 
Imperfect competition possess perfect mobility, they will move 
till their rewards relative to their marginal product in each 
occupation are in equal proportions. 
Thus this position, although ao ideal position for 
the single firm is an unstable equilibrium for the Industry. 
Of course an~; move away from this ideal 1,)0Si tion would reduce 
the profits of the ~reducer below his maximum attainable 
profits. 
However, if we but include Normal Profits in the 
average cost curve of the single i)roducer (QQ1 in fig.3) 
equilibrium is again where maximum profits are being made 
(this is supposing, 6nce again, that the conditiods of demand 
and of costs are given). His total profits are maximum with 
output O.B. as here the excess of average revenue over average 
cost (i.e., HE3) is greatest. Multiply this excess by output 
o.B. and this gives the area of Qrofits (RFHE3). However, 
since the cost curve QQ1 includes normal profits it follows 
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This shows that following from the less than 
horizontal demand curve of Imperfect competition the effects 
of this type of Imperfect competition are to render the 
single producers price higher and his scale of production 
smaller than under Perfect comµeti tion. (9) 
It has been assumed that each producer was faced 
with the same cost curve and was likewise faced with the same 
demand curve, thus each producer was making the same profits 
and the position E3 on fig.3 would thus be a stable equilibrium 
for the Industry of this particular number of producers. 
(d) Effects of Entry: 
But if entry was not restricted this position 
represents an attraction to other entrepreneurs and the greater 
the shaded area the greater the attraction. Import Control 
made it possible for this shaded area to be enlarged and thus 
new i'actors and i;iroducers were attracted to the Industry and 
the equilibrium E3 was not tenable.(iO) 
The entry of new producers can have one or both of 
two effects:-
(1) Effect of the Cost our~ituation: 
Quite possibly the entry of new firms by enlarging 
the number of units in the Industry will make it possible for 
(9) E.H. CHAMBERLIN - Op.cit. p.77. Here we are dealing 
with the field of Atomistic Imperfect Competition. 
(10) A further alternative can be formulated. If price is 
held constant, there is a possibility that product can 
be varied or adjusted. However, it has been assumed that 
figs.2 and 3 have been drawn with reference to the optimum 
'product'. Thus it is evident that, the price of' OR (i.e. 
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external economies to arise, thus making for specialised 
services that are available for all ~roducers.( 11 ) This 
makes for lower average cost curves for all units. This 
would tend to enlarge the area of excess profits and cause 
a greater incentive to new entrants to enter the field. 
However, after a while, through unrestricted entry 
costs will rise because of the increased demand for the 
factors necessary to the firms. ~roducers already in the 
field will take into account the now higher re~lacement costs 
and irn~ute these into their cost structures. 
As the cost curve has risen through increased 
competition for scarce factors there will be a tendency for 
prices and out~ut to remain the same for each producer and 
abnormal profits will thus disappear. The older firms do 
this by imputation of costs. 
Fig,4 shows this position. E4a was the equilibrium 
pcsition before entry of new firms and it included abnormal 
~rofi ts. Not being a tenable position when there is unres-
tricted entry new firms will raise the average cost curve and 
thus E4b becomes the new and stable equilibrium and will 
incilude only normal profits. 
(11) In the Footwear Industry the smaller firms tend to make 
use of such specialised services as accountants. How-
ever, a most notable feature of external economies 
available to all the Industry is the disintegration of 
the heel making Industry in New Zealand from the Footwear 
firm, into a separate industry, under large scale 
production, thus making economies of scale available to 
all uoits in the Industry. 
Pr,ce 
pair 
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(2) Effect on the Demand Situation: 
The excess profit being made will attract new 
competitors into the field with a resulting shift in the demand 
curve. It_is assumed that as each new firm enters it has the 
same costs, and so merely the number of firms is altered end 
there is a greater output from the whole Industry. While the 
conditions of demand remain the same, the total output can 
only be sold by a reduction in price. There is a new average 
revenue curve as each new producer enters and each firm can 
sell the same but at a lower I:Jr ice. - This wi 11 continue until 
the average cost curve forms a tangent with the new average 
revenue curve at the new equilibrium ~osition of E5 in fig.5. 
At this position no abnormal ~rofits are being made 
and it thus becomes a stable ~osition. However, in the short 
run it is highly ~robable that the ~ressure of new producers 
entering the industry in anticipE1_tion or high Jrofits will 
cause the average revenue curve facing each ~roducer to fall 
at some point below the average cost curve. Losses will thus 
ensue and the realisation thereof will cause an exodus of 
firms until normal profits are being made through the average 
revenue curve for each producer rising because of reduced total 
out~ut, until it once again is tangential to the average cost 
curve, 
In actual practice the entry of new producers will, 
under the original conditions have effects on both demand and 
cost curves simultaneously.(12 ) Such a two-fold condition 
(12) E.H. CHAMBERLIN·- o~.cit. p.84. 
will not affect the an~lysis but ohly hasten the ultimate 
stable equilibrium position. 
(e) Effects of Price Cutting: 
11 roblem. 
However, there is another way of looking at this 
To suPvey this f:-lI'Oblem it is assumed that the 
number of producers is constant with the stable equilibrium 
outlined above and thus there is no entry problem. However, 
when profits above normal are being made, there will be a 
tendency to cut prices until tahgency of the average cost 
curve and average revenue curve is achieved even without entry 
of new Jroducers. 
The pp1 curve in Figure 6 shows the increases in 
sales that a single producer can get by cutting his i?rice, 
only if others don't follow suit, i.e., cut tt1eir t_Jrices as 
wello In this case the demand for his ~roduct would be of 
almost infinite elasticity -- it could never be infinite 
elasticity because of the Imi:>erfect comi?etition structure of 
the Industry. Product.s always have some degree of insulation 
by virtue of product differentiation. 
It has been noted that the eguilibrium under Imper-
fect comµetition is one of higher price and smaller scale of 
production than in .Perfect competitioo.(13) Thus the producer 
has excess capacity. If he can lower his price and not be 
followed by other producers doing the same he will not only 
rea~ larger sales but hi~ average cost would be smaller and 
his pro~its greater. 
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In figure 6 the original output was OB but for the 
single producer cutting his price his output is OB1 at a 
smaller average cost per unit. 
But normally if one producer cuts his price others 
would follow and for the same reasons. Also each producer 
may do the same ss the first producer hoping that no others 
will follow suit. As each lowered its prices they would 
sell more but their sales relative to eBch would be very 
inelastic (i.e., they would remain the same). They would 
thus move down the demand curve .PP1 -and 1:1s they move they will 
reduce their prufits. But as they go down a single ~roducer 
will try to ~rice cut again and thus hope to increase his 
sales. As ~rice cutting increases firms would take up lower 
and lower positions on PP1 until finally equilibrium at E6b 
will be reached and output will be OBi 1. Here normal LJrofi ts 
only are being made. 
In the short run prices may fall below this level, 
if some producers have reserves to cover the loss,by reason 
of average revenue being less than average cost. This would 
tend to force weaker competitors out of business and when this 
is effected prices will again be raised and monopoly of profits 
could result if price rose above equilibrium. 
(f) frice- cutting and Entry Combined: 
It is of course possible and highly probable that 
both price cutting and entry will take ~lace at the same time. 
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the Industry will be attractive to additional producers. 
They will enter the field and will continue to do so until 
the original average revenue curve (PP1) has moved to the 
left and is tangential to the average cost curve (QQ1 in fig.7). 
Here the output is OB and the price is BE7, and all firms are 
making but normal ~refits. The high price is a reflection 
of the high costs of such swall and uneconomic scale of 
LJroducti.on. Each producer will be faced with a large excess 
caDacity and will thus be tempted to reduce prices by the 
possibility of increased profits. If others did not follow 
suit he would indeed obtain some such increase in profits as 
his average costs fall as output increases. The more elastic 
demand curve p~1 drawn through E7 is the demand curve he 
visualises. 
But as each and then all do the same ·they will move 
down the average revenue curve 1-1.e1 aod again [)rices wi 11 be 
cut and the movement downwards will ul tin1ately involve them 
all io increasing losses. If one producer could push his 
demand curve pp1 down to tangency with the average cost at E7a 
then he would be earning normal profits and thus avoid losses. 
But this is not final equilibrium, as the numbers of producers 
are so great that all of them will cut their prices to achieve 
the eguilibrium at E7a. As they must endeavour to do this 
to make at least normal Jrofits their sales will only be OB1 
and not OB 11. Thus their losses are larger than ever and the 
only relief from the situation will be obtained by some firms 
transferriog to alternative occupations. The share of total 
demand will thus increase to the remaining firms and the 
average revenue curve will move to the right and when it cuts 
through E7a all will be making normal profits and output will 
be OB11 (see PP2 in fig.7). Of course in the short run 
prices may fall below this level but as all are making losses 
some units will tend to leave the field and the price will 
return to equilibrium at E7a in fig.7. 
(g) Conclusions: 
It must be remembered that the above ap~roach is but 
a simi:Jlified 11 groul-l" device for i:)Urt?oses of exl:losition. 
The assumption of similar cost curves and average 
revenue curves for all products is not according to reality. 
They do differ widely but as Chamberlio( 14) points out they 
are illustrative of the group, but it should be realised that 
'' on account of diversity, both as to location and as to shape, 
a corresponding diversity of prices, costs, and outputs (but 
not, so far, of profits) obtains throughout." 
Trade marks, however, enter to some extent in the 
footwear trade, These may fragment the market to their 
~articular field. But competition, to the degree that it 
does exist will push the demand curve to the left (as noted 
above) but will do so in uneven degree, depending on effective 
substitutes being ~roduced or because of established consumers 
preferences being strong. Some elements of monopoly profits 
(14) o~.cit. p.111. Brackets in the original. 
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may thus tend to exist.( 15) 
However, the above theoretical BJlJruach suffices to ; 
show that in general the field of footwear manufacturing is 
one of atomistic imperfect com~etition.( 16) Here 111.n~rnal 
profits tend to rise as in Perfect comvetition. 
But in ~erfect com~etitiuo ~rices curres~ond to the 
cost of Jroduction under the most efficient cunditions.( 17) 
Here average cost will be at s minimum and avera~e revenue 
will be tangential to f:JVera&--e cost as this 1·;1ininrnrn. However, 
mono,joly elements sl ter this .siverage revenue curve fop the 
L:.i1°odncer and thus in the field of footv,reAY. L"•Poduct:i.un he is 
faced with an average revenue curve that is falling as more 
units are sold. In seeking tD maximise ~refits he will raise 
price above the minimum snd so restrict output or will restrict 
output to raise ~rice. In either case the eguilibrium will be 
at higher than the corTii_Jetitive L.1rice under Perfect competition. 
It else meocs the ~ossibility of lees than optimum outrut, 
and thus exists excess ca~acity for which, under conditions 





The larger firt11s 'J.sed t11 8de ,'.larks to a great extent. 
However, subetitutes ar-e rnanL1factnrec1 1 i.--'e:chac-•t:i thuu6 h; 
not slways effective unf~s. Also estr:,bliF;hec5. cunsurneP 
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over-ride the genersl e-:iuilj_briLrn1 assLHn;:Jtion. On the 
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the rule. 
Atomistic Irn.,.ie1·fect CornJetjtioo js the field ()f differ-
entiated ~roducts where exist lcrge numbers of ~roducers 
relative to the market UBtrnliy i:JPoducinE.: on E, stilalJ. scale. 
J.E. U~ADE. Od.cit. Oh.II, Part II, ~-111 et.sgy. 
Thjs assumes there are ~ossibilities of larger droduction 
alrePdy existins in some factories. 
As will be seen in the next Section artificial 
restrictions on entry seek to solv~ this ~roblem by external 
means B • d SJecialisation snd other means seek to solve it by 
weans inter • sl to the firm. 
:PART THREE 
THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 
OF ~HE INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY ACT 1936. 
CHAPTER VI. 
THE LICENSING OF THE FOOTWEAR MANUEAQ.!URING 
INDUSTRY UNDER THE INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY ACT(1) 
70. 
(a) Introduction: 
The footwear manufacturing industry was licensed 
on the fifth of September 1939. (2 ) From this date "the said 
industry shall be carried on only pursuant to a license 1ssued 
under ~art III of the Industrial Efficiency Act 1936 and in 
conformity with the terms aod conditions of such license."(3) 
This alteration in the principl~ of operation of 
the Industry was designed to bring economic planning into the 
Industry and to make provisions for the development thereof 
on an orderly and constructive basis. 
The general ~ur~ose of the Act is described in the 
long title as "to promote the economic welfare of New Zealand 
by providing for the promotion of new industries in the most 
economic form and bf"so regulating the general organisation, 
development, and operation of industries that a greater 
measure of iodust~ial efficiendy will be secured.u(4) 





For a full description of the content of this Act see 
":Post-War Industrial .Planning in New Zealand". H.L. WISE, 
Wellington, 1944. 48pp. The activities of the Bureau of 
Industr~ are covered in the yearly reports of the Indus-
tries and Commerce Department - Appendices to the Journal 
H44 series. 
By virtue of the Industry Licensing (Footwear Manufacture) 
Notice 1939. Serial No.1939/150. 
Ibid. Clause 4. 
From the preamble to the Act. N:• z. Statutes, 1936. 
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This meant altering to some extent the comµetitive 
forces that existed in the industry prior to the invocation of 
the licensing powers. The technical considerations of produc-
tion were the same.(5) But by various means, such as research 
associations facilities were offered to all units to improve 
their techniques and the use of most modern machinery was 
facilitated. 
Changes in the sources of supply occurred, as the 
local closely related industries expanded under stimulus of 
the increased demand from the :f'ootwear industry partly because 
of the enlarged scoJe of the market ~ow available to the New 
Zealand Industry and partly because competitive raw materials 
were now not available following Import Control. 
Competitive price adjustment was also controlled by 
means of price control. These changed factors of operation 
of the Industry will be discussed later in this part. 
Under these ~lanning operations security, with 
normal i?rofi ts, in the long run became the thertie as Oi:Jposed 
to the more fluctuating profits of the short run. The 
Annual Report of the Industries and Commerce Department 
referring to the work of the Bureau of Industry sums up this 
ideal as aiming at securing benefits in the long run rather 
than in the i mmed ia te future. ( 6) 
Beaurity im~lies welfare and by their application 
to come within the provisions of the Industrial Efficiency Act 
the manufacturers of footwear in effect realised that the 
---------
(5) See- Ap~endix A. 
(6) Appendices to the Journal H44 - 1937. p.25. 
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protection afforded by licensing provisions of the Act made 
it necessary for them to take every possible step to see that 
the public was adequately served in quality, price and range 
of footwear9' 
(b) Method of Licensi~: 
Under the main Act the Bureau of' Industry was set 
up. This consisted of 10 ordinary or State members and 4 
special members, two of which were nominated by manufacturing 
and two by farming interests. This Bureau carried out the 
functions of the Act and became the industrial licensing 
aLJ.thority. (7) 
The Minister of Industries and Commerce could, at 
any time require that any industry be carried on pursuant to 
a license issued by the Bureau and he was also the appeal 
authority against the decisions of the Bureau on licensing. (S) 
In the provisions for making an ap~lication for ~ 
license it stated that a majority of units, and employees in 
favour of licensing, was necessary before the application for 
the invocation of the licensing provisions of the Act was 
considered. A full examination was made of the Industry 
before it was licensed. The Bureau must be convinced that 
"licensing would be in the best interests of the industry 




Appendices to the Journal H44 - 1937. p.24. 
Later on an independent appeal authority was set up -
H44 - 1937. p.25. 
H41-~ - 1 9 3 7. p • 2 6 • 
( c) Th@ :Effects Gf Lic~sing: 
The fire t phase of this piann in g of the F6otweat> 
Manufacturing It1dust:ry was the, licensing thereof., 
shown in - the previous'. chapter when entry is urorestricted · the 
ultimate st~ble equilibiium ie a position ;of normal profits 
as in figures¾ or 5 at E4 on E5, res~ectivelyi This is 
arrived at generally by increased 6osts and~falling prices. 
Its path to =the stable equilibrium may be, prolonged by 
rigidities and imperfections of the market proces~es. 
For instance if the demand curve for the product 
varies this·' stable -equilibrium will be upset. Bouts of 
over and under-expansion may .also arise as small entrepreneurs 
are seized with capital over enthusiasm. 
In. these periods the· uneconomic structure of the 
Industry is (;)Ortrayed by less' than· nGrmal pvofi ts:., This, 
Wou.ld mean that in figure 2 the dernat:id curve PP1 throughout 
its whole length would be below the average cost curve QQ1. 
If we return to our original and simplifyiog.,assumi;:ition that 
each t,Jroducer is faced with the same cost' and demand eurves 
then all untts will be making less than normal pro:f!its. 
This is an unstable position a~d stability will only return 
when some units leave the industry and normal profits are 
ag~io made. 
Licensing of footwear sbught-to remove this unecon-
omic competition. It should thus so control eptry into the 
Industry that the cost curve (QQ1) of the firm forms a tangent 
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to the demand curve PP1. At this point all producers would 
be making nortnal profits and the Industry would be in a stable 
position. At this ~oint all producers who have the oppor-
tunity to change their position would thus have no incentive, 
and those who have the incentive would hsve no opportunity. 
Thi~ brings us to the point of price cutting. 
Normal profits are made at the equilibrium E7 on figure 7. 
But by reason of excess capacity firms have the incentive to 
cut prices in order to reap additional profits. This process 
would carry on till the equilibrium position of E7a in figure 
7 is reached. · In the process the number of firms has also 
been reduced. Thus entry must be so controlled that excess 
capacity is not so great as in figure 7 at E7. The position 
E7a should be the equilibrium aimed at by the control of entry. 
At this point, which is theoretically the stable 
equilibrium, there is the possibility that the producers, with 
large enough reserves, will be able to push out along the 
more elastic demand cur~e (pp1 in fig.7) by lowering the price 
even th~ugh it means losses to them. This will eliminate 
their weaker opponents (in the sense of lack of reserves)C 10) 
and leave abnormal profits to the remaining firms. 
(10) This· is'' not necessarily the most efficient firm. Conser-
vative policy may have meant the amassing of reserves 
instead of purchasing new ~lant etc. A modernly equipped 
firm may have had no time to consolidate. See E.A.G. 
ROBINSON - 0 The Structure of Cornpeti tive Industry" - Ot?• ci t. 
t?-95 et.seg. Also the technically inefficient units may 
be f.)roducing inferior articlea, yet be economically more 
able to survive. Here competitive wastes are socially 
undesirable and the technical and economic efficiency 
aspects do not coincide. K.E. BOULDING - O.,..i. cit. p.L,.94 
et.seq. 
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It thus becomes imperative that some form of price 
control is necessary tq offs.et th,e wastages of this monopol-
istic competition. .ftn·t:ry restr.ictions fflone then, du not 
solve the whole problem of the socially disadvantageous 
effects of this type of competition. The rationalisation 
gowers discussed below also aimed at correcting or arresting 
these forces. 
CHAPTER VII. 
FURTHER PLANNING FEATURES OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY ACT. 
76. 
In addition to endeavouring to obtain greater 
efficiency in the Footwear Manufacturing Industry through 
licensing of units, consideration was given by the Bureau of 
Industry to the formulation of a plan for the reorganisation 
and the rehabilitation of the Industry. 
Firstly the Industry, now licensed, had to agree as 
to the formulation of a suitable ~lan. Once agreed upon it 
was submitted through the Bureau of Industry to the Minister 
of Industries and Commerce for avproval. After a~~roval it 
was to be administered by an Industrial Committe~ a~~ointed 
by the Minister from i;;ersons nominated to him, by the var•ious 
interested parties. 
The Industrial Efficiency (Footwear) Regulations 
1941 set. out the composition of this committee. It was to 
consist of 9 members, of whom 5 were to be representatives of 
the lid~nsees, 2·or the workers engaged in the Industry and 2 
Government nominees. Later, in 1948, the composition of this 
committee was altered to reduce the Government nominees to one 
~ad to increase the workers' nominees to three-<1 ) 
-----·-----------------
___ , _______ _ 
(1) Statutory Regulations 1948. Serial Number 1948/33 entit-
led "The Industrial ~fficiency (Footwear) Regulations 1948" 
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Their powers to administer this i)lan were obtained 
from the Licensed Industries General Regulations 1940. (2) 
Briefly these regulations governed their deliberations on the 
plan, the conditions that may attach to any license, the 
procedure to be followed in maki~g applications for licenses, 
the lodgrnent of appeals, and the b,layment of annual fees and 
levies. 
However, the scope of the plan was within the Indus-
trial Efficiency Act reguirements. In general it sought to 
expand and co-ordinate the -Industry by(3) 
(1) ·Regulating entry of new units in accordance 
with economic considerations and services required to the 
consumer. 
(2) Fostering amalgamations and rationalisation 
where redundancy in the numbers of units existed. 
(3) Maintaining more efficient means of manufacture 
and also of distribution. 
(4) Increasing the quality of the products. 
(b) The Imµlementatioo of the Footwear Plan. 
The Industrial Committee sought to iml:)lernent this 
plan along varlous lines. It is provosed to discuss same 
under the broad headings of (1) and (2) above. 
(1) Regulation of entry: 
gated all apvlicatioos for licenses. 
The committee investi-
In particular they 
(2) 
( 3) 
Statutory Regulations 1940. Serial Number 1940/279, 
p. 969. 
See 'Appendices to the Jouroals' H44 series 1936 et.sgg. 
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investigated license applications as follows:-( 4 ) 
(a) For all new licenses to commence busioess. 
(b) For extensions of existing licenses as regards 
(1) types and processes 
(2) types only 
(3) processes only 
(4) size range only 
(c) For variations of conditions of existing 
licenses. 
(d) For transfer of ownership of licenses, includ-
ing change of name and incor~oration into 
companies. 
(e) For additions to ca~ital. 
(f) For transfers of factories, including the 
erection of new factory Jremises and opening 
of new units at other addresses. 
(g) For permission to open machine rooms or Jart 
process factories. 
(h) For additions to existing floor space in 
factories. 
(i) For ~ermission to install additional plant. 
(j) Fo1· cancellation of existing licenses or 
portions of licenses. 
After investigation thereof it made recommendations 
to the Bureau who were the actual licensing authority. However, 
(4),. Ada1,>ted from the Footwear }'lao Industrial Cornrni ttee' s 
Newsletter to the Industry. 
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it is recorded that on almost every occasion the Bureau con-
firmed the Committee's recommendations.(5) 
The effects of the restrictions on entry of new 
competitors has been discussed above.( 6) The necessity to 
control the licensing of the various activities within the 
firm ~ertai • i • g to ex~a• sio• of the unit of production is 
more particularly described below. One form of licensing is 
complementary to the other and both are needed to bring 
stability to the Industry. 
(2) Fostering amalgarna tions and ra tio • alisation. 
By rationalisation is meant 1tactio • taken by the State or by 
the majority of producers i • a ~articular industry to bring 
that industry under a single control.tt(7) In the Footwear 
Manufacturing Industry this meant a ttdevelo1:,>ment along 
organised lines of self government"(B) subject of course to 
the scope of the ~la • as voluntarily accepted by the Industry 
and also subject to the aim and tenor of the Industrial 
Efficiency Act~(9) 
Firstly the Committee had to ascertain the require-
ments of various types of footwear needed to meet all consumer 
regu.irements. Import and production figures over a number of 
years were studiGd and stocks and sales trends in distribution 
channels in their relation to population statistics were 
(5) Ibid~ 
(6) Chapter VI, 
(7) J.E. MEADE, o~.cit. ~-174-
(8) A~~e• dices to the Journal H44, 1941. J.11. 
(9) H44 - 1940, ~-17. 
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examined, to assess the average usage of footwear in New 
Zealand. From the resultant figures an estimate of the 
country's requirements -- 'from swing back toeless creations 
of plastic to thigh gumboots' -- was made and ~o~ulation 
planned accordingly. 
In order to i ITil:J le men t this .,.i lan e ffic ie ntly it was 
necessary to subject the Industry to some degree of S~ecial-
isatio •• It was realised that the insufficiency of 
population would not warrant specialisation on the same lines 
as adopted in America or to a lesser extent in England. True 
s~ecialisation in the Footwear Industry would mean s~ecialis-
ation in one type of shoe by one process, but the turnover 
necessBry to rea~ the economies of the resultant large scale 
production is far higher than is warranted by the extent of 
the New Zealand market, (10) Thus in New Zealand, it is 
customary to make at least two types of shoes in order to 
ol:?erate without any undue waste of material. 
To im!?rove quality and. to stabilise the Industry 
some degree of specialisation was absolutely desirable. In 
1947 it waB estimated that to give effect fully to the 
planned i:Jroduction programme the various Jlants would be 
utilised t_o -t;_pe follovving extent: 
(10) This is the opinion, ex~ressed in an interview by an ex 
officer of the Plan Committee, who is also an executive 
officer of the N.Z. Footwear Manufacturers' Federation, 
Heavy plants 
Veldtschoeo ~laots 
Yvel ted i;,lan ts 
Machine sewo, fair 







11 The effect of the ~ila n will be to considerably 
reduce ty~es and ~rocesses io individual units without 
reducing the ~reduction of such tyJes and ~rocesses 
collectively. 0 ( 11 ) 
To ensure the effectiveness of this ~lan the 
Committee had to be sure, that when considering new licenses 
no section of the Industry would become overproduced. This 
was guarded agatnst by extensive investigation of all a~pli-
cations for extensions to licenses to cover types and 
~rocesses, additions to ~lant and to capital, buildings etc • 
.A ~lant register was also ke~t by the footwear technical 
officer in order to keep ~osted of the JOtential outJut of 
the Industry. Not only were new a~plications of extensions 
of licenses exhaustively checked, but a continuous sur·vey of 
existing licenses was maintained in order to eliminate any 
license that had become redundant through non use, lack of 
i,llant materials or labour. ( 12 ) 
In general it would Bi:Ji:lear that so far as Jrocesses 
are concerned licenses are only issued for s~ecific combinat-
ions where more than one process is a~Jlied for by the firm. 
. '1 
For instance a license would not be granted for the manufac-
(11) Footwear Plan Industrial Committee's Newsletter to the 
Industry. 
- (12) Ibid. 
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ture of both hard and soft sole sli~~ers as these are 
entirely different processes and require more or less s~ebial 
knowledge- In many shoes Veldtschoen f:.lrocess should be a 
se~arate unit, but fairstitched, machine sewn rivetted and 
screwed processes could be worked in conjunction with each 
other. Although preferable to have welts as an only process 
it could lJOSsibly be worked in with the others. As far as 
women's shoes are concerned cemented ~recess is usually 
adopted .. There a~Jears to be a big demand for cemented 
footwear and a fairly large seasonal demand for women's shoes 
~ f 1 7) 
made by the Veldtschoen and welted Jr • cesses.~ ~ Here 
again grouf:.lings, as for men's would be desirable. It would 
thus appear that there is a larger scof:.l e fo I' SLJec ia li sat ion 
in women's shoes than in any other class of footwear. 
These ~oints were taken into consideration when 
reviewing licenses and wuuld lead, if adof:.lted, to greater 
efficiency. '11he aim of the plan committee should be to 
concentrate the production of footwear in the more efficient 
plants and thus to reduce the numbers until each remaining 
plant is working at as. near to caJacity as ~ossible. This 
has been partly augmented by the cancellation of over 20 
ljcP,nses or portions of licenses and also by fostering of 
amalgamations. 
• ,-1 
It has been ascertained thst, when investigating 
lic6nse applications, some of the principal factors taken toto 
(13) O~inio • of units of the Footwear Trade. 
consideratidn by the ~lan Committee are:-
(1) Financial standing of the applicant in relation 
to his varticular object. 
(2) Types and guantities proposed in relation to 
ability of existing units to cover the market in both quality 
and quantity. 
(3) Trade or technical exJerience and business 
ability of av~licant. 
(4) Process proposed to manufacture by and origin 
and availability of proposed machines required. 
(5) Suitability of ~ro~osed ~remises for manufac-
turing ~ur~oses and whether registration by the Labour 
De~artment is or will be granted. 
(6) Quality, design and workmanshi~ of sam~les 
submitted or procurable. 
(7) Reports of technical officer. 
(8) Objections lodged by Jarties entitled to object. 
All this ~lanning points to the systematic organis-
e t1 on of the Industry .. 
To the extent that output could be concentrated in 
fewer firms than would normally o~erate, they could each 
~roduce at a greater capacity aod by so doing lower their 
average costs. ~lanning of production and s~ecialisation 
were conscious effo~ts, eofo~ceable at law, to reduce costs 
and also to relate supply more closely to demand. By so 
doing they were ensuring a market for the out~ut of the 
84. 
restricted number of firms and thus bringing stability to the 
Industry. 
Some evidence of their work can be gauged by the 
fact that, of over 180 applications for licenses since the 
plan was implemented in 1941, only 40 Bt,>t-1roxirnately were 
recommended and these mainly were for sales through their own 
shops only, Of 110 aJ~lications for extensions only 60 
a~~roximately were recommended for a~~roval. Additions to 
LJlant were numerous, but these were in the rnai n to foster the 
installation of new and modern machines. 
With the expanded market made Jossible by Import 
Control regulations it was necessary to increase the number 
of units io the Industry but the plan adopted by the Industry 
made it possible for expansion along organised lines. 
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CHAPTER VIII. 
RESTRICTIONS ON COM.PETITION IMPOSED 
BY THE ACT. 
£'.OSSIBLE DEFECTS AND RBMEDIES THEREOF, 
(a) Restrictions on Gom~etition aod possible defects: 
The rationalisation ~rioci~les described above ~ut 
further restrictions on com~etition. By reason of not being 
able to manufacture any type or ~rocess unless already 
licensed, restrictions were imposed on the mobility of factors 
to move where they thought their best rewards would be. How-
ever, by doing this it prevented the Industry from over produc-
ing in any particular line to the extent that would result in 
acute competition. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the plan 
has lead to a concentration of out~ut. This has not meant 
that labour has been thrown out of em~loyment. By reason of 
the contem11oraneous exl,)ansion of the market through imf:.)ort 
controls, increased labour has bee• required. Mechanisation 
was increased when the footwear industry was rationalised. 
The ~ajority of machines io use in the Industry require the 
attention of OJeratives and to this extent operatives are 
still required.. 
In so far as consumers' t-1references were irrational 
by Jreferring ooe product to another similar one, it was sought 
to remove this tyi:)e of waste of corn:)eti ti oo. This woLJ.ld 
remove, partially too, the wasteful competitive advertising. 
All phases of the planning activities restricted 
competition to some degree and it was thus J?OSsible that in 
the ~recess, the ~lan removed the incentive to maintain 
quality. It may also remove rational consumer's' Jreferences 
as it could influence or com1:>el demand to accel? t its selected 
supply. This of course, implies mo • ol_)oly 1:1owers. This may 
lead to his inability, as Jreviously, to occasionally buy at 
'dumved' !!rices on a coru~etitive market.Ci) It also increases 
the Industry's i:->ower over the ~rices they can charge to the 
consumer and also over the ~rice they have to JBY for their 
factors of proa·uction .. ( 2 ) 
It is here worthy of note that the !?rice mechanism 
has the function of keeping ~reduction and business from being 
conducted 'blindly' and 'withocit plan'(3). Alterations 
therein, indicate the best alternative uses for scarce 
resources in order to satisfy consumer's effective demand and 
thus tell the entrepreneurs what quantities and qualities are 
desired. 
But this assumes .l:-'erfect Com11eti tion and as show• 
heretofore, many imperfections of comi:Jetition exist in the 
Footwear Trade,. The planning of footwear sought to remove 
some of the wastes of competi tioo on the i:Jroduction side. But 




H.R. BURRONS and J .K, HOR8Eli'IELD - nEconornies of 1:'laoning, 
.2rinciLJles, and 1iractice 1'. (i>ami:>hlet SeriesNo.1) The 
American J~csderny of .l:'oli tical and Social Science. _k)hila-
delphia, 1J35, p.9. 
J.E. MEADE. 011.cit. ~-175• 
T .. T, HOFF 1'Economic Calculation in a Socielist Society0 
0 I?, C i t • LJ" 1 91 o 
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ideal of Perfect Competition. A major criterion of this 
latter type of competition is that there should be no arti-
ficial restrictions on the movements of factors. (L~) 
On the other hand rationalisation principles use4 
in the Industry did not seek to dis~ense with the ~rice 
mechanism in its entirety. But there may be a tendency that 
the_remaining units in the Industry may become lethargic. 
They can control price or out~ut and as they have no external 
com~etition their output can be sold regardless of quality. 
The on us is thus on the con trolling body, to take measures to 
see that the monopoly powers, enlarged by law, do not wipe 
out any benefit the consumer• should obtain from the better 
regard to his wants. 
(b) Manner in which these defects were guarded again§!: 
(1) B~ activities of ~lan Committee. The Plan 
Committee obtained its powers through lega 1 enactrnen ts and 
through the Bureau of Industry whioh was the State authority 
to see that the plan was implemented in the s~irit of the 
controlling Act, viz., 
of New ZeEiland .,.,u 
" ••• to promote the Economic Welfare 
.Ea:rly in this i,.>hase of ~laoning the Committee 
obtained the services of a com~etent technical adviser to 
eeaist them in their deliberations. His ex~ert knowledge 
was used to assu1~e that production standards and -quality were 
maintained and improved upon where necessary. 
(4) J.E. MEADE - supra. p.96. 
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The methods whereby production standards and 
product quality were maintained, can be best discussed under 
two broad headings, viz., Maintaining efficient means of 
manufacture and secondly, increasing the quality of the 
b)roduct. (5) 
(a) Maintaining efficient means of manufacture: 
The technical adviser maintained surveys of plant 
ca~acity, material reguirements, labour needs, production 
allocetions and the generAl working of the S~ecialisation 
plan.· .He also- rendePed assistance to the New Zealand Stan-
dards Institute in its formulation of footwear standards, and 
advised and assisted individual manufacturers on their 
t:-'roblems .. 
Some as~ects of the ~lao Committee's work in this 
sphere are subjoined. 
(1) Leather supplies: Checks on the correct use 
of leather were made an~ their use to the best advantages were 
encouraged. They also sbught, by liaison with the Tanneries, 
the Factory Controller (in the war ~eriod) and Industries & 
Commerce (re imports bf raw materials) to guarantee that the 
Industry was well sUpl,-llied with leather and other necessary 
materials. Also that production was not hindered through lack 
of these sources, ~thereby j~opardising the plan to maintain 
adequate consumer rroducts, the requirements of which, had been 
arrived at by regressive analysis. Up-to-date monthly 
(5) Information herein contained has been adapted from the 
Newsletter of the Plan Committee as circulated to the 
Industry., 
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statistics were collected and these helped to trace the trend 
of production and correlate it to the community's needs. 
( 2) .Plant & Machi ne£.;Y: r equiremeo ts: Here the 
fundamental idea was to encourage firms to maintain technical 
progress by fostering the use of n WY and modern plant. A 
close liaison with the Industries and Commerce Department, 
and with the main machinery sui;i:;,lying firm was maintained. 
The idea was to ensure that imports of machinery were available 
to those units needing them. 
(3) Standardisation: Throughout the life of the 
Pian Committee the technical adviser worked in close co-operation 
with the New Zealand Standards Institute in their work on 
formulation of standards for footwear. This gave the Industry 
knowledge of the various grades and the legal requirements of 
those grades. These legal regui~emeots were evolved to give 
a measure of ~rotection to the co • sumer, in as much that he 
knew that certain mini1num standards -- and incidentally necess-
ary standards of quality for the work the shoe was reputed to 
be serviceable for -- would be ~uaraoteed to him by the 
presence of the Trade Mark of the Standards Institute.( 6) The 
growing del_.)endence and accei?tance, by consumers, of the 
Standard Mark as a criterion of serviceability of the product, 
has tended t6 make manufacturers conscious of its use. 
(4) Industry Information: In order for a plan to 
be successful there must be both unity of purpose and clarity 
(6) Legal authority obtained pursuant to the Standards Act 
19lt1• N.z. Statutes No.1941113, t:1°141. 
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of purpose. This is best obtained by keeping the units in 
the Industry fully informed of the sco~e and workings of the 
~larining_ authority. 
Whenever information was obtained by the Plan 
Committee it was disseminated to the Industry by means of the 
newsletter or by special memoranda through the Federation of 
Footwear Manufacturers. 
The research facilities of' the New Zealand Shoe 
and Leather Research Association -- affiliated to the 
DeJartment of Scientific and Industrial Research -- were used 
extensively by ·the Industry.. Through this medium externa 1 
economies were available to all units in the Industry. 
A cost accounting thesis competition was organised 
by the Committee in conjunction with the New Zealand Society 
of Accountants. The object was to obtain costing methods 
that would be available for adoption by the Industry in order 
to improve costing methods within the Industry. 
(5) ~ersonnel Training: In this s~here much 
work was outlined but war-time conditions did not L..JeY·rni t of 
its imJleme• tatioo. The idea was to train production experts, 
su~ervisors, foremen end artisans, io order that their training 
would be passed on to the workers in the Industry. 
(b) Quality of .1:Jroducts: 
The consumer is entitled to benefit from the imple-
mentation of the plan, for the consumers' welfare should be 
the ultimate end of any planning and organisation. 
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But to ensure that control over quality was 
available, besides using the conce~t of quality as a µre-
requisite to the granting Qf a license, it is also necessary 
that other measures be taken to ensure maintenance of quality 
productsa This was done by: 
These regulations wei->e administered through the 
Industries and Commerce Department. Under their provisions 
it ·was an of'fence to sell footwear unless it was branded with 
the manuf'ac turer 1 s name or a representation thereof. The use 
of the Standard· MB.rk was taken as an alternative to the 
branding requirements. These regulations tended to make the 
manufacturers quality conscious. With the degree of s~ecial-
' , 
isation adopted in New Zealand it was i,.>Ossible for firms to 
still indulge in cOmf)etition to some extent io tl1e way of 
guali ty .. By beiog forced to brand their name on their geed s 
they sought to _irntJrove their quality in order to maintain 
their rnarl{et. 
(2) Other activities:· 
These included ~ublicity regarding the com~arative 
quality of New- Zealand and overseas i:.lroduction -- incentive 
pay to inc·rease the worker's i ntere_st in his job -- Research 
Associations ,to car•ry out investigation of alleged defects --
. and designing competitions to increase the guality of products 
(7) 
, ________________ _ 
These regulations were issued pursuant to the Board of 
Trade.Act 1919• Their full title is ''The Board of Trade 
(]'ootv,ear IVIarking) Regulations 194611 - Statutory Regul-
ations 1946 - Serial Number 1946/89. 
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and to incor~orate the h~alth maintaining Jroperties, ~artic-
ularly io fashion shoes. 
(II) By State ~rice Control: 
(a) The mono~olistic JOwer over Jrices introduces 
the need for Price Control. This is a two-fold need. 
Firstly, minimum price fixationC 8) is necessary to 
stop any large firm with reserves from price cutting in order 
to force the smaller units out of the Industry., This could 
be brought about by such firms OQerating et less than normal 
rrofits (i~e., below the equilibrium position of E7a in fig.7). 
By so doing the remaining firms would earn increased profits 
as entry is restricted by licensing. 
Secondly, maximum ~rice fixation or control of 
~rtces is essential to safeguard the consumer from any ex1:;1loi t-
atioo by reason of the moOOi:,>Olistic 11 owers over l!r•ice that the 
Industry obtains by licensing. I o times of c omc1eti tiot1 
(subject tu the rigidities outed in Cha 11 ter X) if llrofits are 
&bove normal there will be an influx of factors. Through 
increased output ~rices will ultimately fall, until once again 
normaL profits are made. With entry restricted, the price 
mechanism caqnot bring this about and there is oo stimulus to 
keep ~rices down to the normal level. It is here that the 
need arises to control prices to protect the consumer. 
(8) 
--------------------·----
Minin111m price fixation is hePe meant, the taking of steps 
to fix a legal minimum price below which it is illegal to 
sell footwear. 
(b) 1'.he_M~_!hods of Price Control used in the 
Industry: 
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(1) Before Licensing. From 1936 onwards, follow-
ing the institution o;f the 40-hour working week anr't cer-tain 
wage adjustments, limits to f)rice increases were made. The 
Prevention of ~rofiteering Act 1936 made it an offence to 
increase prices by more than the increased costs resulting 
from the increased wage bill. This enactment did not fix 
i;lri ces. It merely gave to the Indus~ries ~nd Commerce 
Dei;,artment i.JOWer to investigate Jrices where dist!roi:-iortiooate 
increased had taken 11 lace. ( 9) 
(2) Board of Trade (~tice Investigation) Regulat-
ions 1939.( 10 ) 
The enacta1ent of these regulationB was &n endeavour 
to kee~ ~rices from rising dis~roi:-iortiuriately to costs. 
Footwear manufacturers who increased prices after 
this date had to notify the Price Investigation Tribunal of 
their intention to raise Jrices and to give reasons therefor. 
(3) !E-e proclamation of' an emergency under the 
Public Safety Conservation A et 1932: On the first of Se~tem~ 
ber 1939, pursbant to this Act, the Price Stabilization 
. ( 11) 
}'~mergency Regulations were gazetted • 
No ''footwear prices could be increased beyond the 
--------
(9) See ~~~endices to the J6urnals 1936. H44. ~.26. 
(10) Eoacted·on 2/6/1939. 
(11) These regulations were added to aod a!ilended· from time to 
time. All enactments were consolidated into the Control 
of ~rices Act 1~47. For a detailed study of these 
regulations see HWar-time Price Control io New Zealand" 
H.L. WISE, Wellington, 1943• 79J11• Also u~roblems of 
Price Control-•, H.L. WISE, Wellington, 1944, 
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price ruling on the 1st September 1939. As this date receded, 
imported and locally produced raw materials and factors of 
production increased in cost, making it impossible to hold 
prices at this level. ~he Price Tribunal gave permission 
for ~rices to be increased to cover actual costs only. These 
increases were to be a~Jlicable ooly to goods incurring such 
increases and no additional profit was allowed. -This denoted 
two radical departures from norm• l business activity. 'Vhen 
manuf'acturers replaced raw materials they automatically costed 
the balance of old stocks at their re~lacement values. ~refit 
~ercentages were always taken on the new costs. 
The effect of this measure was to kee~ margins of 
~refit the same as in 1939 but as costs increased the percent-
age of ~rofit on cost of production tended to fall. 
In general footwear prices were regulated on this 
princi~le up to about 1942. 
On the 15th December 1942 the Economic Stabilization 
Emergency Regulations wer•e gazetted~ This plan was designed 
1' to promote the economic stability of New Zea land by preventing 
o~ at least minimising inflation and by holding down the cost 
of living within narrow limits."( 12) A range of essential 
corrnnodi ties waS tabulated and, as f'ar as t,; ossible, standards 
of manufacture for these lines were adopted. InclLlded in 
these commodities were Men's, Nomen 1 s, Boy's and Gi1·l's shoes 
made from New Zealand leather.( 13) ~rices for these lines 
were stabilised at the ~rices ruling on the 15th Decem~er 1942. 
(12' .. Al:Jt,->Bndices to the Journals H44 - 1943. 1:-'•1• 
( 1 3) 0 " 11 11 H44 - 1 942 • t? • 2 . 
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increases in costs of manufacture were to be abso~bed by the 
manufacturers, or failing this, the tendency was to subsidise 
costs of manufacture. 
The ~ethod used in the Industry was: 
(1) To allow increased costs to be borne by milit-
ary contracts. 
(2) To allow higher margins of profit on non 
essential lio.es. 
(3) Enforcement of quotas for manufacture of essen-
tial or so-called 'utility' lines. 
In effect this method meant military and non-essential 
lines were subsidising the manufacture of essential lines. 
While military contracts absorbed a large ~roportion 
of the ~roductive capacity this arrangement appeared to work. 
From 1945 on, the disparity in prices between essential and 
non-essential lines became more acute. ~roduction of non 
essential lines was far more remunerative. This made the i?lan 
committee's activities increasingly difficult, by making produc-
tion quotas hard to achieve. 
Through co-operation between the ~rice Tribunal and 
the flan Committee the solution of the problem was sought by 
means of standardised costing systems. A~plications were in-
vestigBted an~ prices fixed on their individual merits. In 
general, prices were fixed on the basis of cost of i,iroduction 
plus f)rofi t margins. ( 14) . These were maximum :,)rices and lower 
prices could be charged if desired. 
·--------------------·-----
(14) See Appendix O £or a short discussion oo Total Costs and 
Normal .li-'rofi ts. 
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(III) Conclusion: 
Unless the price fixed under ~rice control is that 
which would have arisen in a "free" market, SUbJi:>lY will not 
autom~tically be equated to demand. Thus the function of 
price as an allocator of resources, must be augmented by either 
~reduction or consum~tion controls.( 15) ( 16) 
As production cohtrols are administered by the ~lao 
Committee, a close liaison between the State ~rice control 
authority and this committee is necessary. 
( 15) 
( 1 6) 
K.E. BOULDING. Op.cit. D•150. 
Consumution Controls were introduced for a short period 
in N.z: per medium of rationing. 
CHAPTER IX. 
THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF .eLANNING_. 
Part of the aim of i:-Jlanniog has been to achieve 
the equation of su~ply and demand at lower cost. This has 
been achieved in the Industry to the extent thst there has 
been some reduction in the excess caJacity inherent in the 
trade. It has meant, with the given conditions of demand, 
the taking of measures to ~ush down the average cost (re~re-
sented by the curve QQ1 in fig.7)( 1 ) to a Joint nearer to the 
minimum average cost. It has also meant that with the costs 
as given, forcing of the average revenue curve (PP1 in fig.7) 
to the right till it intersected the avernge cost curve at an 
equilibrium Joint E?b. _This ~oi • t, by definition must be 
nearer to the lowest average cost. 
By this movement the Industry should reap the bene-
fits of increased scale of production, denoted by increasing size 
of the establishments and increasing value of outputs as well 
as of their yolurne. ~fficiency too, will be denoted by 
iricreased volume and value of ~1ant Jer establishment. 
(b) ~2.£rais~d of the position. ( 2 ) 
Table VIII gives details covering the licensing ~eriod 
1933 to 1948. Firstly the size of establishments did increase 
(1) Oh. V. 
(2) Tables used throughout this chal)ter are cotn!)iled from 
statistical data in t!1e Annual Rei:Jorts of Pactory J!roduc-
tion. 
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reaching their peek in 1942. The value of iiroducts ~er head 
also increased but the purchasing power of money decreased in 
the period also. The volume of outiiuts per head shows 
increases again reaching their peak in 1942. 
tablishment shows increases as well. 
.t' lan t per es-
T.ABLE VIII • 
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~laot & ~owerjOut1:-1ut 
per Estab. i}er Estab. 
per week 
H.P. .i?lant .Bairs 
£ Nos. 
20.1 2,065 969 
21. 3 2,115 992 
24.0 2,328 1,229 
29.2 2,758 1,419 
29.1 2,939 . 1,722 
· 33. 3 2,990 1 , 38L1. 
33.7 2,900 1,385 
31.7 2,907 1,337 
31.6 2,929 -1, 195 
_33. o 3,361 1,206 
32. 9 ILA. 1,160 
-
Value & OUti}Ut 










733 1, 118 
781 1,177 




N.A. denotes information not available. 
The rate of growth _of the Volume of Production can 
be gauged from the following figures: -
In the period 1911 to 1932, the volume of output per head rose 
by 51°6 or approximately¼% an • ually. 
11 u It 1932 to 1938, it increased 39% or @yn-1 21° annually. 
11 lt 11 1938 to 1942, " II 29/G or 7j[/4 " 
n " II 1938 to 1948 II " 13<J·b or 1-k?~ H 
99. 
Apart from the period 1938 to 1942 no substantial 
increases in vroductivity per head seem to be effected by 
planning of the Industry. 
Table IX em~hasises this point. 
TABLE IX. 
Ind~x Numbers of Volume of Factory Production ~er 
;E,fil:.§.QQ Engaged. 
Year: 
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Some reasons for the decrease j_n the rate of growth 
per· person emvloyed after 1942 wvuld be accounted for by the 
following: 
( 3) The remarkable growth in i,Jroducti vi ty of' fq.RJW'M,~~RJn the · a 1929 t 193k · · rtly the effe,..t of tltWn.tal'iff' per lO . O .,; 18 pa CAtr'r'nu::uru UTVH,SiTY COl-l!iG'I 
protect100 gra,nt ed to the Industry. CHilJ:FCHURCH, li.Z. 
1 oo. 
(1/'1 Sh t f or age o· ma • ~ower. Wartime ma n11 ower 
directions did ensure that the Industry had a reasonable 
su11 ply of labour. However, this µrotection was shortlived, 
for early in 1945 manpower restrictions were lifted and the 
stimulus to go to alternative occulJations was very great. 
This leod to decentralisatio• by the larger firms. They 
Ol)ened machine rooms end other part process factories in 
suburban and rural areas to attract labour. (4 ) These would 
tend to be small fActories and treated as additional units 
in the statistics, would incline to decrease the size of the 
establishments and the volume of production Qer head. 
(2) Material, and to a lesser- extent machinery 
shortage, ham~ered the workings of the s~ecialisatioo plans 
from 1943 onwards. 
1945. c5 ) 
The l)OSition however, was irnt_--1roving by 
(3) The needs of the War Economy. 
Committee re~orted that 16 temporary licenses were granted in 
the war i:Jeriod to !11eet the rey L1irernentB o:f the Pactory 
Controller( 6). These were for the manufacture of s~ecific 
wartime needs. 
(4) Rehabilitation of ex-servicemen. lo the 
latter years many ex-servicernen were set up in the footwear 
industry by rehabilit~tion sssistaace. The units they formed 
( L+) Branch factories were established in such towns as Inver-
cargill, Gore, Temuka, Ashburton, New Brighton, Leeston, 
Raogiora, Blenh~im, Picto~, Wanganui, DanneviTke, Ngarua-
wahia, Thames, Waihi and Rotorua -- Appendices to the 
Journals 1947. H-44 - p.16. 
Footwear Plan Newsletter to the Industry. 
Ibid§ 
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tended to be small ones. 
trend as shown Ufl to 1942. 
This would adversely affect the 
The last two mentioned reasons, of necessity, have 
~riority over other forms of ~ctivity. But however, they 
serve to emJhasise, that planning of the footwear industry, 
being but a segment of the total economy, is likely to cross 
paths with aims and ideals that take precedence, or are 
contr•ary to sume of the exJressed aims of the planning 
authorities. 
Thus ~regress towards the EOal of increased ef'fic-
iency can be checked. 
( c) Stabil~of Returns: 
Returns to the manufacturer, aJeasured in Net Value 
t;1e1~ establishment show a stability that was lacking in the 
~re-licensing days. (See Table IV.) 
Previously this factor varied widely over the yeats. 
High levels have been recorded in 1924, 1928, 1930, 1931 and 
1938 with intervening lqw ~eriods reaching the lowest ebb in 
19.39. _ The manufacturers would look to this f'actor as a guide 
to the St8bility of the Industry. 
(d) ~he O~timum Firm: 
The mo~ement towards the 6ptirnum or representative 
\ 
firm can. also be seen under licensing. 
By an o~timum firm is meant a firm that in existing 
conditions of technique and organising ability has the lowest 
average cost of production ~er unit when all costs which must 
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be covered io the long run, ere included.( 7 ) 
The planning of the footwear industry focuses 
attention on both the technical and financial optimum es the 
main criteria that would govern the size of the optimum unit, 
assuming a market sufficient to absorb the whole production, 
of at least one unit of ovtimum size. 
Machines are em~loyed in teams geared to the ca~ac-
ity of such key machines as lasting aad ~ullins over. These 
have a capacity, varying in degree depending on the style and 
quality of shoe made, They set the i)Bce for t11e whole unit 
and a firm that-wishes to ~reduce to their ca~acity must 
em~loy du~licated services at the next or ~revious stage in 
order to rea~ the benefits from its • Jeration. 
But because of technical difficulties on the ~reduc-
tion side and limiting forces on the demand side this common 
denominator is not a pr8cticable one. It is generally 
conceded that in New Zealand, with given demand conditions, 
a technical optimum would be somewhere in the Vicinity of 
3,uuo pairs ot' shoes per week. 
But as this would be but a small or comparatively 
small unit it is further conceded that et least two such 
technical-9vtimurn units could be managed together. Three 
such units_ ar\e thought to incur- di StJro~ ortiona te in ere a se s in 
overhe&d and would not be warranted.(B) This would mete for 
(7) E.1\.G. ROBINSON. Op.cit,. c-1.15. 
(8) H.-A. SILVERMAN - 0 s tudies in Industrial Organisation", 
London, 1946, Ch.V. ~-199 et.sgy. 
a Size somewhere io the vicinity of 5 to 6,000 ~airs Jer 
week, 
However, we have assumed demand as a ~arameter. But 
if we consider the conditions of demand in New Zealand as out-
lined previously, we find the o~timum size is much reduced. 
Smallness of the lnarket making for a Slnaller· degree of s._1ecial-
isation than in the United Kingdom -- fashion ~roblems -- the 
need for a c1ive~sified ~roduction to cover all n~ec1s -- leads 
to a smaller optimum. It cannot be assessed with any degree 
of accuracy, bu.t en ex member of the Footwear .tllao Coa1mittee 
has stated that· any firm !!rod11cing between 1,000 and 2,000 
Jairs Jer week(g) has reached a fair degree of efficiency. 
The increasing numbers of firms in the category of 
employing 51 or more operatives shows the trend towards the 
optimum. (See tables below). 
TABLE X. (1 0) 
No. of Fir ms in J;ach Grouf.J 
Size based on Numbers of Emdloyees engaged. 
Year Under- 11 to 21 to 51 to Overj;'b of F:Lrms Total No. 
1 O: 20: 50: 100: 100: I above 51 ! of Fir-ms: 
1930 25 16 15 10 5 21.1 71 
'1938( a) 30 10 13 8 I 9 24.3 70 1947(a) 21 17 32 16 I 15 30.7 101 1948(a.) 27 22 30 21 13 30.1 11 3 
'! I 
(9) Out~ut ·per operative is ac-'firoximately 17~ to 20 icJSirs .,;er 
weeko 
(10) Information obtained from Factory Statistics Government 
Printer, Welliogton. 
(a) Denotes informatioo from Census & Statistics Dei:J_t. 
N • .A. 1• 11 not availsble. 
Year: 
-
1930 I 1938~a~ 1947 a I 1948(a) 
I 
!~ABLE XI • ( 1 O) 
Persons engaged in eaq_h Size Groll£• 
Categories as previousll· 
UnderFi-20 21-50 51-100 Over ~ri in Groups 
10 100 of over 51: ·-
126 239 455 730 757 64.4 
N,A. N,A. N.A. N.A,. N.A. N~A. 
87 260 1089 1163 J2368 71.1 









Both these tables show the increased grouping of 
both firms and [_Jersonoel emLiloyed around the okitimum and would 
suggest a • achievement of planning and control. 
(e) Further achievements o_LI2.lannins: 
The success of the [?lan committee's activities can 
also be gauged ~rom the organisation of the Industry on a war-
time footing so that military contracts were fulfilled without 
creating a serious shortage of civilian footwear. It is 
interesting to note thst the average quantity of leather foot-
wear, excluding slippers~ available to the civilian JO~ulation 
during the three years 1937, 1938 and 1939 was 2,975,506 Jairs, 
whereas in 1944, 3,089,764 Jairs of leather footwear excluding 
sli~Jers, were available for civilian use. Of this total 
only 313,632 ~airs were im~orted in 1944 and no less thao an 
·, 
average of 1,029,736 pairs yearly in the three years mentioned 
above.( 11 ) 
(11) Frorn the Newsletter to the Industry circulated by the 
.i/lan Comrnittee. 
At the same time military footwear was being sup-
~lied to all the New Zealand forces and an increasing 
t?roi,>or-tion was being exi:!orted to the 11Allied" forces. (12) 
ExJansion in the Footwear Industry also meant 
exb)ansion in a~lied industries. ( 1 3) To this extent it helped 
to increase the economic welfare of New Zealand. 
( f) Conclusion: 
Efficiency is usually denoted by increasing 
Jroductivity and increasing size of establishment. Noticeable 
achievements in these directions were made UJ to 1942. 
Forc~s however have been recorded that have checked 
this exp a n s i on • 
On the other hand some notable achievements of 
planning have been the organisation of the Industry on a 
wartime footlng, the stability of net returns, and the 
expansion of allied industr-ies. 
There still appears room for a marked increase in 
efficiency and this could JOssibly be brought about by a more 
thorougb imi:-'lementatiun of the rationalisation ~ri oc ih-lles of 
the Ind1-1strial Efficienc~l Act. 
It must be concluded that ~lanning of Industry has 
had but a partial success~ 
( 12) 
( 13) 
AJ~eodices to Journal H44 - 1943. ~-7• See also H44 -
1944 - page 19. 
Ap~endices to Journal H44 - 1943 - page 2 records a 
steady expansion in ~reduction (i.e., in Tanneries) to 
cope with the heavy demand for leather for military 
footwear, etc .. 
.eART FOUR 
s:eECIFIC EPFECTS OF PLANNING 
OF "'H:8 I J\TD US TRY. 
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CHA.tiTER X, 
SOLIS SFECIFIC EFFECTS OF .PLANNING, 
(a) Effects on the Pricing Mechanism: 
The tn~ icing mechanism under free enterprise works 
as sn allocstor of r·esources and of incomes. It has been 
noted (eh.VIII) that the ~rice mechanism stops production and 
business from being conducted blindly and without plan. It 
provides the basis for economic calculations, i.e., it will 
tend, through the allocating of resources to their best 
alternative L1Ses, to ensur·e that consumers' demand is met, and 
that entre~reneurs have a reasonable profit. Through this 
function of allocating resources it also acts as an allocator 
of incomes. 
In 0L1r Jresent clay society there has been a growing 
tendency to interfe1·e with the free f;.;r:nr1tion of ")rices. 
~ruducers try to alter its functions in order, ~artly to 
assure themselves a fixed income, Jartly to ~rotect their 
'vested' interests, end t-iartly to elirnin8te cotnJetitioo enc1 
the insecurity inhereot therein. ( 1 ) 
Egually imJ • rtant is the interference of free form-
ation of ~rices for labour by the efforts of trade unions. 
Governments, too, alter its function. The Liceos-
iog provisioos of the Industrial. Efficiency Act 1936 gives 
legal sanction to the interference with the market mechanism, 
by tending to emvhasise its function of an allocator of 
(1) T.J. HOFF. o~.cit. p.193. 
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incomes. But having authorised this the State must intro-
duce devices for the ~rotectioa of the consumer. These have 
taken the for,i1 of quality, "jroductioo, and J:!Pice contro1s, as 
we11 as allocative measures. 
~echeoism is affected. 
Again the working of the price 
The opening Jaragraph of this chapter is an outline 
of the perfect market ideal, aimed at by would be 'planners', 
and held up by the capitalistic people as the results of free 
enter;;irise. But its operations are fraught with ~ractical 
difficulties (2) end the theoretical smoothness of the working 
of the system is frustrated. There can be no guarantee, 
therefore, that the maximum welfare is anything like attained. 
We have also seen that ~lanoiog of the Industry h&s not brought 
this ideal market mechanism any nearer to achievement. 
(b) The effects on the Consumer: 
Some nine months before the licensing of the Indus-
try, the consumer's freedom of choice es between imi:Jorted and 
locally t)roduced goods h:ad alread;:v been restr-icted by the 
irnli'lerneotation of It,lt)Ort Control. The sco~e of this thesis 
has been to show the workings of the ~lanniog of the Industry 
wit~in this given framework of 3conomic Nationalism. 
(1) The coversge of Consumer's wants. 
The planning of footwear ~roductioa hDs sought to 
give the consumer o com~lete coverage of types of footwear in 
(2) For details of these difficulties see H.R. BURROWS and 
J.K. HORGBFIEID 11Economi©s of Pla.oning, Principles, and 
Practice 11 • Op.cit. Pi!3-i~ 
as many styles and ~rocesses as are ~ossible within its 
frarnewoi:k. 
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The authorities based their production plans on the 
various types available in the days of importations. They 
estsblished the consumption of these various types of foot-
wear by means of regression analysis. (3) In order to keep 
UJ-to-date on consumer reguirements, six-monthly returns from 
retailers were obtained. These gave the trend of sales. 
The monthly abstract of statistics of ~roduction showed the 
types of footwear bJroduced and the authorities could judge 
how best to divert ~roduction to meet current needs. When 
shortages were imminent ~rovisions for- Iw,.Jorts were made. 
Thus the consumer would have a vc, 1 ume of' 0roduc t ion eg ually 
as large as ~revioasly and at the same time ada~ted to his 
needs, ae expressed by his ~urchases of various lines. The 
average of the three years ~rior to licensing showed that 
6,367,067 yairs of footwear from all sources were available 
for consurn(.Jtion. In 19.48 this total stood at 7,569,256 
~, (4 \ 
i,;Birs, ao increase of 19/o• 1 
Further measures to ensure the consumer's welfare 
were also taken. 
(a) A sb)ecial survey throughout New ZealBnd, was 
made of childPen's foot sizes.(5) This helped to establish 
the mul t i1:.1 le fittings needed to give a comprehensive coverage 
(3) The J?lan Committee's Newsletter to the Industry. Ov.cit. 
(4) The per ca11ita\ increase is 7.B;t. 
(5) Ap~endices to the Journals 1946 H44. p.18. 
of the requirements of children's. wear. It assures correct 
fitting and health maintaining propertie~ so essential to 
growing feet .. 
(b) Consumers had the benefi_t of overseas fashion 
trends and changes in style of footwear, by the larger manu-
facturers obtaining Jermission, from [;)a tent holders, to make 
replicas of the most popular overseas styles. All appropriate 
details of making were supplied by the overseas agents, and 
periodical checks were made on production, by sample ranges 
being returned to the patent holde~s for comment, criticism, 
and incor~oration of new ideas into future production. ( 6) 
(c) Other factories in New Zealand are branches of 
well known English footwear firms and their Jroduction is 
guided by English standards of make. ( 6) 
On the quality side measures have been taken to 
imi;.>rove the standard of New Zealand footwear above that ruling 
immediately i;iri or to licensing. The various forms of quality 
controls have been discussed above in Oh.VIII. 
Some improvement in quality and serviceability has 
been noted. Mr. F.H. Caughley, research officer of the New 
Zealand Leather and Shoe Research Association, has stated that 
its 'qualities' com~ared favourably.with overseas production. 
The life of the shoe bears testimony to the quality thereof 
and, states Mr. Caughley, the New Zealand shoe does not have 
to be discarded any earlj_er than its counterpart in cot1ntries 
(6) From Trade Sources. 
11 o. 
with a similar way of life. ( J) This of course does not 
refer to its appearance and the way it fits. 
Imports of both men's and women's shoes were made 
i • 1947 licensing Jeriod. Retailers,(B) generally, have 
expressed the o~i • ion that these shoes have not been of as 
good a quality as identical New Zealand shoes of the same 
l,lri ce range. For instance imported women's utility lace up 
shoes retailed at 68/6 per Jair, which was the t,->riee of a 
much higher g • ality New Zealand product. The N.Z. women's 
utility shoe retailed in this period at 48/6. Similgrly 
with men's medium quality shoes, the im~orted shoe retailed 
at 65/- per pai.r, whereas the best grade high guali ty New 
Zealand ~roduct retailed at 54/6. Wholesalers found trouble 
in selling these stocks aod ultimately liguidated them at 
less thao cost. The majority of the men's medium qtJ.ality 
shoes ultimately were jo'Jbed out by retailers &t 37/6 per pair. 
They also state thst New Zealand calf and chrome 
leather shoes are as good as pre war quality, but that this 
cannot be said for kid and glace kid shoes. The demand, 
throughout the world, for this raw material has been greatly 
expanded in recent years and much sub-standard material has 
found its way on to the ma~ket~ 
The technical footwear adviser to the plan committee 
has recorded that New Zealand shoes have increased in quality 
but makes the reservation that further imJrovement could be 
(7) The ~ress, Christchurch, June 28 1950. 
(8) Details obtained in the course of interviews with retail-
ers who have or control footwear retall stores throughout 
New Zealando 
1 1 1 .. 
made o ( 9) 
Price control on footwear prices has sought to keep 
footwear Jrices from showing any dis~roportionate increases in 
cot,JJBI'isoo with other consumer goods' t.Jrices. The consLrner's 
i;)Pice index as at June 191+9 showed footwear lJrices to be 1003 
while the all groUQS' index was 1002.< 10 ) 
at 1007. 
(2) gonsumer's freedoLl of choice: 
Food ~rices stood 
The licensing of the Industry has meant that no 
fewe1~ tha·n 1 JO firr,JS vvho a'='Jlied for- licenses and have not had 
them granted, have not been able to bring their vroduction to 
the :nark et,. ( 11 ) · The consumer has not had the benefit of this 
~ros~ective production and to this extent his freedom of 
choice has been restricted. Rationalisation within the Indus-
try has also curtailed his choice. 
By the idea of consumers freedom of choice is implied 
some conceJt of the sove~eignity of the consumer. It is taken 
that he determines the nature and intensity of his wants. His 
preferences will be ref'lected in the ef'fective demand at the 
ruling ~rice. Through this he influences production and 
directs it to the fulfilment of his wants.< 12) 
This notion imJlies he is a comdletely free and 
(9) W. DENBY. Ol) • Cit. (Article uni;;1-1blished). 
(10) ~rior to 1949 the Footwear ~rices Index wss incor~orated 
in a cotn.;osite index of' clothing and foot-wear. 
(11) Of cour•se tlle instabilities tlH:it 1oay have been generated 
by this increased ~roducti0• •IBY have had other adverse 
effec..:ts. 
(12) T.B. H031 F. oi:J.cit. i;-1,71+. 
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autonomous individual. He is the ultimate and exacting 
judge of what is to be ~roduced. 
But the consumer "can only choose between those 
goods which the producers have been kind enuugh to sUi:Jt:-1lY" (13). 
In the i:'rocess, he is also influenced by ad.vertise,:ients, 
cultur>sl and. social i:-'attePns and may, through ignorance of all 
~rices ruling in the market, or of the technical ~ro~erties 
of th~ goods, be unable to exercise his. freedom of choice 
effectively. 
Under ~lanni• g, the consumer can still exercise his 
choice between the goods available to him. 
(3) .Qonclusio_Q: 
From the above it ap~ears that the consumer's wel-
fare has at· least been maintained, through the measures taken, 
unter the licensing provisions. 
valuation of his welfare. 
But it gives but an objective 
Welfare includes some notion of satisfactions and 
these are usually subjec.tive valuations. 
unmeesur-able. 
They are thus 
Furthermore when one act is done in the economic 
sphere, it may have an Oi:JJOsite ef:f:'ect on some other sector 
of the ecodomy, thereby affecting the individual. This involves 
inter1:1er-sona1·•cot,1i,,iarisons of utility in order to evaluate the 
net gain or loss to welfare, ~od, as such valuations are 
---.--.....,_..,.... _____ _ 
(13) H.R. BURROVJS and J.K. HORSEFIELD. 01,J.cit. i:1.6. 
113. 
impossible, it cannot be stated if the general welfare of the 
public in New Zealand has been increased or decreased, 
Effects of Bureaucracz: One of the most popular 
objections against state control and ~lanniog in industry is 
that :i:~ entails much bur'eaucracy and high costs. In the 
footwear ~la• committee's activities, it has bee • noted above 
that its actions have to be confirmed by the Bureau of' Indus-
try, acting as the Industrial Licensing Authority for the 
Government. 
This must entail some dela;?. Often it is necessary 
to make quick decisions in order to gain thereby. But with 
the necessity to await confirmation frotn the Bureau the delay 
may wi~e out-the benefit to be gained by a quick decision, 
In t irne the e.conomic act i vi t~? becomes gear-ed to the admi ni s-
.:~t .. 
treti ve delays that are, to some extent, unavoidable in 
governmental direction. Thus the whole cosmos of activity 
is slowed down and quick decisions to meet the market changes 
are generally impossible. 
Some fears of this have been expressed at various 
times< 14). It -was thought that the Bureau would be unwieldly 
as it consisted of busy de~artmeotal heads and business men. 
It soon became ap~areot that they had to delegate ~ewers and a 
permanent committee of 5 was set working in a full tirne 
CB p 8 City• ( 15) 
It wss also feared that it would rnerely become a 
( 1L~ B • R • Tumr.2; R • 0 J • c i t . 6-' • 1 1 :> • 
(15 Ibid, .,;.11(:i. 
11 h .. 
licensing authority and keep peo~le in business rather than 
making industry efficient.C 16 ) However, the formulation of 
industrial ~lans is an attem~t to achieve efficiency and 
here the machinery exists and is a~Jarently efficient.( 17) 
The planning committee set u~ under this scheme for 
the Industry consists mainly of JBr~oonel who have a first 
class knowledge of the Industry's requirements and can direct 
its a cti vi ties efficiently. No details of any delays are 
Pecorded, but it is stated that on almost every occasion the 
Bureau confirmed the committee's recommendations. Thus the 
Industry was guided by technical men who had a working knowl-
edge of the trade. 
The money costs of b)lanoing were not high. A small 
levy was collected from each unit based on the value of their 
output. This in the ma i o was used to foster Pesearch work 
and other activities outlined in the plan. 
The real costs of any delays that may have occurred 
cannot be gauged in money costs. It is inevitable that some 
delays must occur when some direr.:: tions of industr;y are taken 
away from individual units and i:>laced in the hands of a central 
controlling body. Of course the gains accruing to Industry 
from such a ~rocedure, may more than offset the wastage of 
time incurred in making decisions, or the alternative may be 
(16) Some evidence of this aJJeers to exist judging by the 
numbers of licensed industries com~ared with the Indus-
trial plans formulated for their rationalisation. See 
.Ai;ipe ndi ces to the Journal H44 series. 
( 1 7 ) S up r a p • 11 6,. 
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the case. This could have beeo one of the causes for the 
decision to BJJlY for delicensing. However, the direction 
through the Footwear Manufacturers' Association.will also 
incur delays, but by reason of their guidance being more 
direct, then the time lag could be reduced somewhat. 
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GHA.e'l'ER XI • 
(a) Fut ure___1~ nds: 
Thii ~aper has dealt with the effects of ~lanning 
snd control in the Industry ULJ to 31st March 1949. 
Further achievements of ~lanning are still Jossible, 
mainly through a more thorough degree of SJBcialisation, the 
establishment of incentive Jay schemes, and the implementation 
of a training scheme for skilled operatives. Through these 
measures the Industry could opePate at still lower costs by 
reason of less excess ca~acity. The consumer's surplus would 
thereby be increased and his welfa~e extended. 
However, on the 3rd of August 1949 the Industry 
applied for and was granted a revocation of its license. (1 ) 
Some phases of the Industrial Efficiency Act are now 
being carried out by the New Zealand Footwear Manufacturers' 
Fed era ti un. These include fhiecialisation, statistica1 surveys, 
allocative fun et ions and _ cost i og methods for the unif ica t i. on 
of the working of the Industry. 
But the Industry has lost the benefits of licensing. 
As entry into the Industry is unrestricted new units will 
arise. Also these units, and for that matter old units need 
(1) By virtue of the Industry Licensing (Footwear Manufacture) 
Revocation Notice 1949. Serial Number 1949/109. Full 
reasons for this request are unknown. Concern had at var-
ious times been ex!_.)ressed that the small units were not 
obtaining protection from unlicensed units, by legal 
action not being take• by the Bureau. This may have been 
a contributing cause. Newsletter to the Industry. 
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not submit to rationalisation and cannot be legally forced 
to do so. Concerted trade practices could ~erhaps stop their 
~regress and force these units to subwit to such plans. 
While imported machinery is still controlled by 
exchange control regulations then all a~Jlications therefore, 
must be h1resented to the Industrial Division of the Industries 
and Commerce Department before a license to import is granted. 
Thej.r recommendstions must take into account the 'business 
prospects' of the ap9licant and the scope for a fair return 
on his activities. This still gives a measure of indirect 
control to the State. 
In the future the Industry could be subject to 
instabilities throlJgh comL:.ietitive wastes, or, alternatively, 
if it is free to rationalise itself, then prices or su~ply 
may be fixed to retm~n higher than normal i!rofits. The pL1blic 
could thus be worse off. 
While ~rice control still exists the State can 
control this factor in the interests of the consumer. It 
can also~ if necessary, guarantee normal Jrufits to the 
Industry if the Staters 0rice J • licy is the fixstion of 
minimum prices ss op~osed to Jrice regulation and control. 
On the other hand, through keener comJetition the public could 
be better> off. 
The JUblic should not, in the interests of their 
welfare, be subject to control arrangements that ex~loit 
their relatively inelastic demand for this necessitous article. 
11c3. 
If the Industry is to have protection from overseas com~et-
ition then it should submit to rationalisation and control, 
or, alternatively, have restored it, com~etition, with its 
good and bad effects so much talked of, not only by the 
Industry, but also by the 1_..1 ublic. 
Of co11rse this ol!ens lls) other- vroblerns, mainly 
ethical or moral, and to that extent is outside the scope of 
this thesis .. 
(b) Summar;y-: 
The following Joints have bee• made in this QBper:-
(1) The conditions in the Industry ~Pior to 1938 
focused attention on the instabilities of the relatively 
uncontrolled activities of the various firms. 
(2) These instabilities were noticeable in a large 
excess ca~acity io the Industry -- s high costing structure --
a relatively low guality outgut, often at less than remuner-
ative prices -- aod increasing 1.mperfections of co1n""eti tioo 
and the market Jrocesses. 
(3) It was clear that stability was necessary for 
a well balanced Jroduction. 
made by ths InduEtry. 
Normal ~rofits would then be 
(4) The restrictions on ImJorts further em~hasised 
the need for a s;ystematic exl-iansion of the Industr;f on 
organised lines to cover the enlarged market. 
(5) The extension of the Industrial Efficiency Act 
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to the Industry brought this stability aod made ~revision 
for an organised exi,)a nsi on of the I ndnstr-y. 
(6) Through Rationalisation and S~ecialisstion 
it brought about a measure of increased efficiency to the 
Industry, iae., a reduction in excess ca~acity. 
(7) The Industry should be so organised that it: 
(1l i)er~etuates the optimum firm >2 maintains quality at reasonable prices 
\3 brings in sut'ficient revenue to cover 
all expenses and give Normal Profits 
to the Industry. 
(8) Rationalisation and SJecialisation however, 
iml,)ose restrictions on comi;:,etitioo. 
( 9) This control of comJet i ti on ci-ea tes a legally 
sanctioned monopolistic structure in the Industry. 
(10) This structure tends to t:)lace the t,1ublic at a 
disadvantage and the small firm at the rner•cy of the lar•ge 
i'h•m. 
needed~ -
_ ( 11) In order t-o remove these defects there ar·e 
I ) \ 1 
(2) 
( 3) 
guality and ~roduction stsoderds 
research end information fscilities to 
disseminste_ new and im~roved ideas of 
~roduct1on. · 
a µolicy of Jrice control. 
(12) This ~rice control policy must be so imrle-
meoted that the firm covers costs and earns a Normal Profit. 
This .;iolicy places ernb)hasis on the f'unction of the price 
mechanism as an allocator of incomes. 
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(13) To the extent that Jlenning restricts the 
consumer's ~ossible choice, the ~lanning Authority must take 
ste~s to safeguard his interests. 
(14) In the Planning Committee's activities this 
has been done by: 
(1) Regressive aoolysis and statistical 
surveys to gauge the intensity of his 
wants for- various ty~es Bnd styles of 
shoes. 
(2) Maintenance of guality standards. 
(3) Maintenance of technical ~regress and 
fashion trends in the Industry. 
The ex~ansioo of the rootwear Manufacturing Industry 
has been an integral ~art of' the industriel develoljrnent of New 
Zeal&nd. This development has been designed to rnaintein Fu.11 
Emvloyment of both persons aod materials, and also to overcome 
the serious potential menace of unem~loyruent in a simple 
economic environment such as characterised New Zealand for 
many years. 
The organisation of the Industry pursuant to the 
Industrial Efficiency Act has meant the regulating of the 
entrance of new units into the· industry, in a mannei-- calcul-
ated to have i'Ull regard for an orderly long term development. 
The intPoduc'ti on of the footwear i:'lan, meant the 
develo~meot along systematic organised lines, to ~rovide for 
the elimination of wastes, the a~Jlication of efficient 
methods of co-ordination of Qroduction, the encourageweot of 
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scientific and industrial research, the formulation of 
standard sJecifications, standard trade descri~tions, and 
the Jromotion uf schemes to better the social welfare of 
~ersons engaged in the Industry. 
Its achievements have shown that these controls 
have been partially successful in their ~ur~oses. 
The haQhazard conditions of o~erations in the 
Industry ~rior to 1939 have show• that some form of controls 
was necessary to give stability to the Industry. 
The rationalisation JrinciJles ot' the Industrial 
Efficiency .Act give the best means of achieving this stability. 
Decisions could be legally enforced and also the State was 
able to take measures to see that the consume1~ 1 s welfaPe was 
i:.)rotected. 
The ~artial success achieved in this decade of 
planning and control Doints to the benefits obtainable by 
such measures. It also shows that a greater success could 
have been achieved by a more thorough implementation of 
t,1lenning. · 
The effects of such vlanning on the general welfare 
of the ~ublic are hard to assess as any comvarison involves 
subjective valuations. 
The ~lanning of the Industry ~oints to the im~ort-
ance of co-ordination of such Jlanniog activities, and the 
need for unity of ~ur~use as well as clarity of ~urt,1ose. Such 
~lanning, of Jart only, of economic activity is liable to 
clash with other ideals and its effectiveness as a form of 
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control can thereby be jeorardised. 
If plB nning is to be successful then there is a 
need for an over-riding ideal and the correlation of activity 
to this one aim. 
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APPENDICES 
SOE:S CHARACTERISTICS OP n:'}L~ INDUSTRY. 
B. THE MONOPOLY OF THE BRITISH UNITED SHOE 
IvlACHDIBRY COM.l?ANY. 
c·. NORlilAL rROPITS. 
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.,\l<Pli~NDIX (A) 
Some Characteristics of the Industry. 
(a) Raw Materials used: 
11 The most significant concept of economic efficiency 11 , 
states Boulding 11 is that of the prodLlction of utility per man 
hour of life".( 1 ) But, however, this does not lend itself to 
c~uaoti tative tnet,sur-ement. A conce~t must be found that will, 
in some degree, measure economic ~rogress. This concept may, 
ultimately, be less significant, but it will give an aJproxi-
mate measure of such. An index of volume of t.Jhysical t.Jroduc-
tion could be used as such an indicator. 
If such an index is to be used then it is fitting that 
regu.ire,nents of efficiency in that t.JI'odu,ction shoL1ld be noted. 
The footwear manufacturing industry will need 
technical efficie • C;\T of plant, nl8chioery and management, but 
will, in particul~r, require adequate SUt.JQlies of raw materials 
at reasonable ~rices. 
These materials will include:-( 2 ) 
Bottom leather bends, 
bottom leather shoulders and bellies, 
outside upper leathers of many kinds, 
1 lining leathers, 
rubber in various forms, 
ral:Jer and pL1lp. 
----------------------
(1) K.E. BOULDING. Op.cit. p.649. 
(2) From 11 The Boot and Shoe IndLrntr-yn. OtJ.cit. t?•2 et.:::;eg. 




cotton end linen threads, 
latex and rubber adhesives, 
other than rubber adhesives, 
plastics, including celluloid, 
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paints, varnishes, and finishes in many forms. 
The main material is leather. The bulk thereof is 
Jroduoed locally. 
for- use in wo:nen' s fashion shoes. These include ~atent 
leathers and kid and suede kid leathers. ~roduction of the 
former is climatically impossible in New ZealA • d, while no 
herds of the latter, for raw material SUJJlies, exist in the 
CO ll• try. 
The efficiency of the Industry de~ends to a large 
extent on good buying and good using of leather which require 
the exercise of ~ersonel skill and knowledge only to be 
fained by long experience. 
Tha majority of the other materials are imported, 
or have im~orted com~o• ehts i • them. 
(b) Method of manufacture: 
Footwear ma • ufactJre is divided into a large number 
of operations, mainly ~erformed by machinery, whiuh is highly 
specialised but is not automatic in OJeretioo. Factor-ies 
are usually organised on a departmental basis under the 
following heodings:-
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(1) Clicking Department: U~~ers and linings are 
cut in this section~ The cutting of u~~ers is a highly 
skilled process and is usually performed by male o~eratives. 
Linings are cut by juniors under training. 
Glos i ng De1c; art:neo t: The several rarts of the 
u~~ers are stitched together in this section. It involves 
many oJeratiooe, mostly mf3chanical ana. j_s done by female 
labou.:t'. 
(3) Rough Stuff Department: Sole and bottom 
leathers are cut sod sundry grades are sorted. r,Iale opera-
tives are em~loyed in the press cutting part and remale 
operatives in the preparing section. 
(4) Lasting and Making Department: The closed 
U;_Ji;ier is here shaped on to a last and the sole is attached. 
Attaching may be effected by machine sewing or, cementing 
(vv0meo's footwear• mainly).· Male labour only is ernplo;yed. 
(5) Finishing ~epartme • t: Soles are smoothed a • t 
edges,heels etc. finished. A surface finish is ~ut on the 
sole* It involves a range of mechanical processes carried 
out entirely by male laboLu•~ 
·, 
(6) Cleani • L and Des~atch DeJartment: 
are ~lossed and cleaned snd the com~leted ~roduct is boxed 
and desi:-'atcher.L Female lsbuur only is em~loyed 
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(c) Costs in the Industry: 
By far the biggest percentage of costs sre found in 
materials and labour. It has been assessed that materials 
amount to about 48 to 52% of total cost of Jroductiun (before 
eccounta • cy Jrofit added) ~roductive labour costs from 30 
to 42% -- aod unproductive labour to about 3 to 5% varying o• 
classification given to this item. 
costs:-
( -1 ' \ I / 
(2) 
(3) 
The following items are likely to B~JeBr in overheed 
Salaries: 
foreman in 
(~rincipals, directors fees, clerks, one 
each department). 
Rents and rates. 
Light, power and hegt. 
(4) Machine rentals (royal ties charged direct). 
(r:;) - -'- l t ,~ l • surances -- s~ocA e,c. 
(6) Insurance -- ~m~loyers liability. 
(7) Bank charges and interest. 
(8) Re~airs to buildings a • d machinery. 
(9) Advertising. 
(10) Printing, stationery, office ex~e • ses, etc. 
(11) Carta6e out. 
(12) Bad debts. 
( 1 3 ) Lego l end a ud j_ t charges • 
( 14) 
( 1 5) 
( 1 6) 
DeJTecistion 
~R0l~1·n • s (hoXAS ch0 rged direct). v . ..J .. • 0 '", ..... - .... u 
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(d) Methods of Distributio•: 
A highly com~lex system of distribution has existed 
f'or some time in the _Industry. f3ome factc;,rieB I'lW their own 
wholesale organisation, while others extend their control into 
tl1e retail field as well. 
(a) 
(b) 
( "' \ V / 
( d) 
The chief methods of distribution are as follows:-
'c/holessle: - They make direct JUrchsses from menu-
facturers, carry stocks, and make sales to 
retailers. 
l.~ul tJ.21:e retailers: - L1ake direct ;;1 urc hases from 
til8n ufa cturer s aod wholesalers. If they 
are mL1ltiple manufacturers, they wj.11 make 
transfers from their own factory as welle 
They carry stocks and usually have a central 
warehouse sod distribute to their own stores. 
Lar0;e f3 tares: - Direct ~urchases are made from 
manufacturers and wholesalers. 
Small retail~:-. Direct l,)Urchases fr>orn manufac-
turers snd who1esa1ePs. 
The MonolJo_1x of the Brit:i.sh United Shoe 
Machinery Gorni2anv Ltd. (1) 
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The majority of the machines in use i • the New 
Zealand footwear factories are the product of this ComJa • y. 
They SUJ~ly the key machines in the main shoe making depart-
ments, other than the closing room. (2 ) 
(a) The Control of the Compa.9.X~ 
The New Zealond compaoy is a bra • eh of the English 
In turn this British cornf)a ny is controlled by the 
United Shoe Machinery Gor~oratioo of Boston, Mass. U.S.A. 
They O'rm i02, 135,390 of the total ordinary share ea i;.ii ttJl of 
I -Z) 
£2,759,961 of the British Company.\~ Both the British and 
the American companies manufacture similar tyi,>es of machinery. 
The working party re~ort notes that the comJany 
t;il'oduces between 130;G and 9o;j of the shoe machines used in 
~ngland and io the Domini~ns. (4) The United Shoe Machinery 
Cor~oration holds e similar ~osition in the United States and 
Canada. 
(b) Leasing i1.l,stem: 
The comJany's position in the Industry is greatly 
. ··1 
strengthened by their ~olicy of renting machines. None of 
their key machines can be ~urchased outright. A fixed yearly 
(3) 
(4) 
Hereina ft eP peferPec1 to as 11 the Comi;:ia ny". 
In the main the closing rooms use Singer Sewing Machine 
Company's machines. These are sold outright to the firms. 
Vlorking 1)ai~ty Reports: 11Boots & Shoes" I:I.M. stationery 
Office,London. 1946: page 100. The dividend paid in 1944 
wa·s 13-~-;L tax. freea 
Ibid. 1).106. 
rental is payable and under the terms of the lease the lessee 
undertakes to use the machine for 20- year~ s, :failing whi'ch, to 
~ay a sum of money as compensation~· 
A further variable Pent, or royalty is also i?&Yable. 
This varies, in the total sum payable ~ccording to the output. 
The key machines have a meter attached to them. 
Thi~ renting of key machines, however, carries with 
it an obligation to rent other machines (known as 'tying 
clauses'). In ~ractice this has me~ot that all machines in 
the ~ain depa~tments are the ~roduct of this com~any. Usually 
there is inserted in the lease an alternative system, but this 
means that, if' the Com[)a • y's machines are not used throughout 
the firm, higher_rentals ere payable.(S) 
(c,) j\dvantages ,of the Scheme: 
t) 
(1) The main advantage asi?ear•s to be the ability of 
the manufactur·er to keei.J _his t-ilant ui;:i-to-date wi tho11t heavy 
outlay of capital. 
(2) The close liaison between the :i!:nglish and the 
American companies has meant that new machine& are do~mally 
adopted at comL~iarable S!:Jeeds in the two co11ntries. ( 6) Tb.rough 
this method, the Dominions benefit also •. 
(3) Each company has i~s own research organisation. 
Exchange of ideas and results. lead to compare ti ve rates of 
t~chnical progress in both countries and thro11gh their dis-
tributive organisations the whole western world benefits. It 
(5) 
( 6) 
The StandaPd Engineering Company appeF,rs to be the only 
other corngany making similar machines and operating in the 
British Empire. It is doubtful if their machines are used 
in more than 5;'10. of the local Industry. 
Working Party __ ~epor t. ___ Op. c it. i:->. 101. 
is doubtful if smaller firms could finance ~uch research 
organisations. The footwear Industry would thus stand to 
lose if the mono~oly JOsition of this company was removed. 
Disadvanta~: 
(1) By far the greatest disadvantage lies io the 
uncontrolled monob)oly l,)Osi tion of the Comi;iany. 
(a) The fixed rents co0ld be classed as 
general scarcity rents for the use of this economically scarce 
factor of ~la • t in this Jarticular industry. But by its 
tnonoJol is tic Q os i ti on it ea n include 8 BJ ecific scare i ty rent 
known as a differential rent. 
(b) The royalty [.)eyrne~ts are io the nature of 
monopoly ~refits. They are payments obtained by reason of 
the Comb)any' s almost comi,Jlete control of some of the scarce 
factors needed to 1nadufacture footwear rnachine1~y. 
The cost structure of the footwear manufacturing 
industry is increased by the inclusion of the abnormal rents 
or· ~rofi tr, to the company. . They a re not needed to keep the 
Oornl.)any in the business of manufacturing plant. The1r 
removal would thus not cause instability in the Industry, but 
would, at the same time, increase consumers' welfare, through 
decreased costs to the footwear ma nufa.c turers. 
(2) The restrictions im~osed on the mobility of 
factors by the imJositioo of tying clauses could react against 
the technical Jrogress of the Industry. Incentives to create 
new ideas of machjnery develo!.Jment are jeoi;;ardised by the fact 
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that the entrepreneur is estopk)ed, by the terms of his lease, 
from using them. 
Conclusions: 
The monopoly JOsition of the com~any has been built 
UJ against a background of li tigatiun with ilossible coml?eti t-
ars ..••• 0 This hc,s criJpled the latter financiall3r snd forced 
them either to go out of business or to amalgsmste with the 
British United Shoe Machinery Comp a• y. u ( 7) 
In other words their actions have led to a restric-
tioo in competition. This formation uf a monorolistic 
strtJ.cture means that the company can either control price or 
output~ In the public interest, it has been noted that 
quality, production and price controls thus become necessary.CB) 
Some control over the price the Company can charge 
should be instituted, in the interests of the QUblic welfare. 
The working Jarty re~ort( 9) is of the opinion that 
if the tyi • g clauses were removed uthere is no doubt this 
should give a great impetus to the Standard Engineering 
Company. H 
In the short run this may be so, the result too, may 
include some reduction in the mo • o~oly rents earned by the 
British United Shoe ~achi • ery ComJany. But there BJJareotly 
are great economies to be gained by large-scale o~erations. 
To this extent the ComJany could octtbid the Standard Comt,Jany 
for the factors of prodv.ction, ond CDL1ld "'erhaps uoc1ercut this 
latter com~any in price and by increased services. 
Ibid. 1?,100. 
Chai:->ter VIII. 
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The ultimate result is highly indefinite. If the 
Standard Engineerinc ComJany can incresse its sales to the 
detriment of the British United Shoe Machinery Com~any, the 
position is still indeterminate. 
The field will be one of imverfect oligo~oly. 
Analytically we can only generalise. There seems to be no 
reason why the equilibrium J • sition ultimately arrived at 
should not range from a pure monopoly JOsitiorr'down to the 
tE,ngency vosition of 001~mol !?rofits. (iO) The possibility 
uf a rgentle[iJen's ssree1nent' SLlggests that ~Pices rrwy be set 
b~r sgreernent t0 r-e tu.rn rnoPe than normal i:Jl'Ofi ts t.J both 
c • nlrnnies. 
The conclusion is that the vower of the '3ritish 
United Shoe Llachinery ComJany Limited over the Jrice of this 
scarce factor should be c~ntrolled by law. 
(10) .c].H. CHAI.1BBRLIN. Ci:1.cit. ,.J.100 et.seg. 
Al~.l?ENDIX ( Cl . 
Nor rna 1 .F r of i t s. 
Throughout the foregoing study it has frequently 
bS~n mentioned that thci entrepreneur seeks to make normal 
~rofits(1) as the necessary inducement to stay in this par-
ticular business. A brief discussion of this concept is 
ai!L;ended below. 
(a) Total Costs: 
When we refer to total costs __ we t:iea n totnl outlay 
plus normal profita.( 2 ) This is the minimum that entreJren-
eurs require to keeJ them in that ~articular business. 
•rotal outlay includes the total cash ~ayrnents to 
factor-s OP in.,;uts .jlus tl1e cost of all things the firm owped 
at the beginning of the year. These are what Bo1J.lding terms 
'virtual expenses'.(3) This conce~t would include:-
(a) Remuneration to the entreJre • eur, if employed, 
measured in terms of his next best alternative occu~ation. 
(b) Other things owned by the fiPm 1 valued at th.e 
rate of their trA • sfer earnings. 
general scarcity rents. 
(c) Payments for. inputs. 
That is they wuuld earn 
To arrive at Normal 
?rofits we hav~ firstly to find out what Total Revenue consists 
of. This would be a summation of the Total Cash received 
Ch• V. Sut,-1r'a. 
K.E. BOULDING. Op.cit. p.457. 
Ibid,. p .. 422 .. 
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for the output and the value of all things sold by the firm 
to itself at the end of the trading period. These are kn own 
as the vir,tual receiJts. (h) The difference between the 1.rotal 
Revenue and the Total outlay is actual ~rofit.(5) Normal 
Profit is a deduction from this coocei.Jt of actual ~rofit. 
( b ) ITQ!Z.illa l _!X o f i t .§. : 
Roll ( 6 ) suggests that normal Jrofits include --
(1) Wages of rnat1ageu1ent. 
(2) Interest on cai.Jital· 
(3). General Scarcity Rents. 
All other ~refits are abnormal or Nonopoly Erofits.(7) 
In the conce~t of Total outlay above we have 
included wages of management and general scarcity rents. 
Eowever, the management will look for a risk premium as well, 
due to the lesser security of the management not being a 
salaried b)erson. 
Interest on capital is a r>ewaPd to counte11 bslance 
tl1e inconveniences and Pisk of the. eotrel}Peneur having his 
savings io the form of goods or in factors to be transferred 
into goods. 
Normal Profits will include then, both Interest on 
CA[Jitsl and th~ risk Jremium to the mansgemeot, if em~loyed. 
In arriving at a fair ~rofit, the ~rice controlling 
authority will include some such conce~t as outlined above, 
(4) 
( c::) ?, 
(6) 
(7) 
I b i d • l1 • Lt2 2 • 
Ibid. i.J.457. 
E. ROLL 11 Elernents of }~conomic Theory11 (Oxford) 1947. 
lJL.:i195-196, 
Ibid tJ. 1 97. 
13s. 
i.e., Total outlay ~lus Normal Profit. 
However, the Industry, seeking to maximise its 
·profits desires to fix t;-'rices to include actL1al f)rofi ts. In 
the footwear trade the abnormal ~rofits would tend to include: 
(1) Differential Rents: This is a i;:iayment for a 
s~ecial scarcity in the Industry. It may arise throllgh many 
causes but usually arises through the special ability of 
management. It may arise through indivisibility of factors. 
In the Industry some factors will obtain a return just egual 
to their earnings in the next best alternative use. They 
are on the margin of transference. Where the returns from 
a factor exceed this earning then, the difference between the 
actual and the transfer earnings is a differential rent. 
(2) Mono~oly ~refits: These arise from the restric-
tiun of out~ut in order to maximise profit. They usually 
versist because of some s~ecial legal sa • ction, such as ~ate • t 
rights or restriction on entry. 
artifici~lly ~roduced. 
Here scarcities are 
(c) Conclusions: 
From ethical standards it is usually conceded that 
Mo •• Joly ~rofitf should be guarded agAinst. This, however, 
still leaves the ~roblem of differential rents. Entrepreneurs 
earning such rects will tend to impute them into costs, making 
a single cost structure for the Industry. Even this proced-
ure still leaves the ~roblern of valuation of some of the 
elements of total cost. 
In retur-n for the security obtained from the 
licensing of the Industry, the units comprising it must 
agree to forego some of their ex~ected benefits in the 
interests of the ~ublic welfare. 
Normal Jrofits as outlined above should be made. 
Br so doing the inducement to entrepreneurs to perfect their 
business technique is not im~aired. On the other hand the 
non-inclusion of mono~oly ~rofits is in the best interests 
of the general welfare of the ~eo~le of New Zealand. 
But the measurement of normal ~rofits is but a 
theoretical concE\JL In i.H'actice it woLJ.lc1 tend to be an ex 
J0ste aJpraisal of the situation. 
